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1I.  Introduction
Economists have proposed and debated conflicting theories of the nonprofit firm for
several decades.  Related empirical research, much of which has centered on the hospital
industry where mixed markets have persisted for over half a century, has done little to resolve
these debates.  This indeterminacy persists, in part, because the theories have not generated
testable predictions (Abraham, et al. 2005) and because of the inherent difficulties of estimation
in health care markets.  Health care markets are not spot markets, and prices are set through
complicated, multi-party negotiations.  It is not always clear who to call the consumer (patients,
doctors, and many others see various prices and other signals and have different spheres of
decision making), patients face limited choices, and there are a host of market failures (Arrow
1963).   Finally, the debates are also unresolved because the large body of empirical research on
hospital ownership is still incomplete.  Studies typically consider hospital behavior in isolation,
rather than in markets that have varied population, competitive, and ownership characteristics.
Here we examine three types of hospitals – nonprofit, for-profit, and government – and
the effect of for-profit ownership share within markets in two ways.  We first examine whether
medical service provision by nonprofit, government, and for-profit hospitals varies with the for-
profit share of their markets.  Investigating service offerings is particularly useful because, in a
highly regulated industry in which managers are constrained in their attempts to maximize
profits (e.g., it is difficult and sometimes illegal to turn away low-paying patients), managers
have some freedom to open or close a service as a way to increase profits.  This explains why
many researchers find little difference among ownership types among many dimensions, but
along dimensions where administrators can influence profitability there are large differences.
(Horwitz, 2007)  We also investigate whether hospital operating margins depend on the
interaction between hospital ownership and market mix.
We find that medical service provision systematically varies both by firm type and
market mix.  Nonprofits in markets with relatively high concentrations of for-profits are more
likely to offer more profitable and less likely to offer less profitable services than those in
markets with relatively low concentrations of for-profits.  Government hospitals demonstrate a
similar pattern, although the results are somewhat weaker than those for nonprofits.  Among for-
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2profit hospitals, we identified no systematic and significant relationship in service provision by
market type (high or low for-profit market share).
Based on these results, we find most convincing either one of two types of theories of
nonprofit behaviour:  nonprofit hospitals maximize their own output (Newhouse 1970) or a
mixed objectives model in which some nonprofits are output-maximizing and others are for-
profits in disguise (Hirth 1999).  Additional empirical results cast some light on which theory is
most plausible.  A large number of specifications show that the effect of for-profit market share
on the operating margin of nonprofits is consistently negligible in a statistical sense.  These
results are more consistent with the Newhouse model than the Hirth model, although we cannot
rule out that some nonprofits are for-profits in disguise.
In addition to presenting new empirical findings that help differentiate among theories of
the nonprofit firm, we address some major empirical challenges to ownership studies.  The
possible endogeneity of location and dynamic market characteristics such as additional firms
entering make it difficult to rule out models in which different types of firms locate in different
types of markets.  However, we find similar results among 1) multiple models, including many
pooled cross-sections and some fixed-effect models, 2) models using various definitions of for-
profit market share, including a new distance-weighted approach, and various cut-offs for high
and low for-profit market share, and, 3) identifying hospitals by their current market type (high
for-profit share or low for-profit share) in some specifications and their market type during the
first year of the study period in others.  These results reassure us that the empirical generalities
are not artifacts of endogenous location that could produce a spurious correlation between
ownership or market type and service provision.
II.  Background, Previous Research, and Empirical Predictions
Slightly fewer than two-thirds of U.S. general hospitals within metropolitan statistical
areas (MSAs) are nonprofit, with for-profit and government hospitals making up roughly equal
shares of the remainder; about one half of rural general hospitals are nonprofit, and about 40
percent are government hospitals.1 Despite active hospital market consolidation (Abraham,
Gaynor et al. 2005), particularly during the late 1990s, ownership shares have been relatively
1 Here we focus on non-rural hospitals.  Although almost half of all general hospitals are rural, they account for only
1/6 of admissions.  We will examine rural hospitals in future work.
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3stable over time.  There has been some growth in the number and size of for-profit hospitals, but
the proportion of for-profit hospitals has increased only modestly.  Hospital ownership statistics
from 1988 through 2005 are reported in Table 1.
A.  Theoretical Background and Predictions
Despite many studies explaining why firms adopt nonprofit status and a few studies
explaining why ownership mix within markets persists, there is no generally accepted theory of
the nonprofit firm.  First, this may be because competing explanations are incomparable.  Only a
few scholars attempt to identify a nonprofit objective function directly, while most only suggest
the mechanisms by which such an objective function might constrain corporate behavior.
Second, there is no comprehensive theory of oligopoly or entry deterrence where firms
have different objective functions because developing one is so hard.  It is hard to specify the
problem in a way that generates a soluble model, even in the case where firms offer a
homogenous good in a standard Walrasian market.  It is harder still to conceptualize the problem
in a market where firms offer different kinds of bundled goods and where many of the
consumption decisions are made without observing prices (in either the pecuniary sense of how
much is charged for a particular medical intervention, or in terms of more comprehensive notions
of price including psychic costs or opportunity costs).  We can, however, offer some rough
predictions based on an informal discussion of the various theories of nonprofits and hospital
behavior.  For the purposes of this discussion, we will assume that entry and exit of types of
hospitals is “sprinkled randomly” around markets, so that there is exogenous variation in
numbers of hospitals and the proportion of each type in various markets.
Finally, there is no agreement on the theory of a nonprofit firm because the various
theories have not been effectively tested.  These theories tend to generate similar, sometimes
identical, predictions about firm behavior.  Observing whether the medical services offered by
hospital ownership types (nonprofit, for-profit, and government) depends on the mix of firm-
types in the market offers some traction on this problem.  Here we discuss how our findings
regarding ownership, market mix, and service provision help either rule out or narrow four major
categories of nonprofit firm theories.  These categories are:  1) firm output maximization
theories, 2) market output maximization theories, 3) “for-profit in disguise” theories, and 4) a
combination of the firm output maximization and disguise theories.  We summarize these
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4theories and predictions in Table 6.
1.  Firm Output Maximization Theories
In the first theory, Newhouse (1970), where nonprofits maximize own output (some
weighted average of various measures of quantity and quality of care), the nonprofit will offer
more health care until profits are driven to zero (in expectation, at least, since the data suggest
that hospitals lose money one year and make money the next).  It may seem that managers of
nonprofit hospitals should be relatively indifferent to the mix of hospitals around them, since
their neighbors cannot dictate output decisions.  Some theorists have sought to explain that this is
the case because certain kinds of actors control nonprofits: managers with particularly altruistic
goals (Rose-Ackerman 1996), such as desires to cross-subsidize (James and Rose-Ackerman
1986); or consumers who control the mission of nonprofit organizations institution directly.
(Ben-Ner 1983; James and Rose-Ackerman 1986; Ben-Ner and Gui 1993).
A nonprofit’s neighbors, however, will take some of their “customers” and thereby affect
the pool of patients they see.  If their neighbors are driven more by profit motives, then the
nonprofit will tend to treat less profitable patients who seek less profitable types of care.  In this
case, the nonprofit’s behavior will be affected through the binding constraint on profits—in the
absence of the profit-seeking competitors “cream-skimming” patients, they would have offered a
mix of services (and served a mix of patients), call it X, that generated zero profit, but in the
presence of the profit-seekers, the mix X will lose money, so they must alter their behavior to
generate additional profits.  Thus a nonprofit will be induced to look more like a profit-seeker in
an environment where there are more profit-seekers, by both being less likely to offer
unprofitable services and more likely to offer profitable ones.
2.  Market Output Maximization Theories
In the second theory, Weisbrod (1988) suggests that nonprofits maximize total market
output, meeting community health care needs where market and government failures leave them
unmet.  Salamon (1987) models government, rather than the voluntary sector, as the residual
sector.  Frank and Salkever’s (1991) model includes total industry output as a maximand.  In a
theory of nonprofits that maximize market output, nonprofit hospitals may attempt to generate
more revenue by adding more profitable services, but they also will react to a mix of neighbors
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5that is more profit-seeking by increasing their propensity to offer less profitable services or to
serve less profitable patients to offset the more mercenary behavior of their neighbors.  Thus a
nonprofit will be induced to look less like profit-seekers in an environment where there are more
profit-seekers, in at least one way, by being more likely to offer unprofitable services, and more
like profit-seekers in that it may also become more likely to offer profitable services.
3.  For-Profits in Disguise
Several researchers have suggested that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals are the same.
Both maximize profits, only profits go to shareholders in the case of for-profits and employees in
the case of nonprofits.  Pauly and Redisch (1973) develop a formal model in which physician
employees capture nonprofit hospitals, operating them to benefit physician cartels by
maximizing doctors’ incomes.  Others have demonstrated that not all doctors may wish to
maximize income, but this would not invalidate Pauly and Redisch’s model.  Young (1981)
outlines a model in which physicians sort into different hospitals, hospital types, or regions
according to their individual preferences including their preferences for philanthropic behavior.
Many empiricists have demonstrated that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals are
substantially alike in important ways (cost, revenue, profits, etc.). (For literature review see
Sloan 2000)  Evidence that nonprofits and for-profits respond identically to incentives tends to
support this third theory.  We, therefore, hypothesize that if both nonprofits and for-profits are
maximizing profits, nonprofits should not act differently depending on the proportion of for-
profits in their markets.
4.  Mixed Objectives Theories
A fourth class of theories combines the first and third, with the same predictions
regarding service provision in different types of markets.  Hirth (1997; 1999) develops a theory
based on competition over quality under which competition from non-profit-maximizing
nonprofits causes positive spillover effects on the performances of both for-profits and “for-
profits in disguise” (i.e., nonprofits that are solely motivated by profits).  According to the
theory, nonprofits drive out low-quality for-profits (that charge high quality prices) and increase
the utility of the uninformed consumers who continue to seek care at for-profits.  Hirth concludes
that quality differences can disappear in markets with a sufficiently high proportion of
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6nonprofits.  Even under this fourth model (Hirth), where only some nonprofits are profit-seekers,
an increase in for-profit penetration (holding constant numbers and sizes of neighbors) should
only affect behavior to the extent that the nonprofits displaced are not profit-seekers.  Thus the
hybrid model offers a hybrid prediction, somewhere between the Pauly-Redisch model that
predicts that nonprofits will look essentially like for-profits, and the Newhouse model that
predicts that nonprofits may look more like for-profits in the presence of more for-profits.  Still,
we would be unlikely to find differences among ownership types if the variation within the
nonprofit form was greater than the variation between nonprofits and other types.
Additional empirical tests regarding hospital operating margins can cast some light on
whether some nonprofits are in fact for-profits in disguise, i.e., the Newhouse v. the Hirth
model.  An increase in for-profit market share may affect nonprofit service offerings under both
models.  A shift in market share, however, should not affect nonprofit hospitals’ profit margins if
they are all maximizing output subject to a budget constraint; nonprofits should earn zero
expected profits regardless of their competitors’ behavior.  Under Hirth’s model it is most likely
that if some nonprofits were, in fact, for-profits in disguise, their margins would be higher in
high for-profit markets.  This is because for-profits in disguise 1) would face less competition
from altruistic nonprofits, and 2) they would act like for-profits which, under Hirth’s model,
have lower profits when facing less competition from hospitals that do not maximize profits.
Further, under the Hirth model, margins among all nonprofits should be higher in high for-profit
markets than others because the effect for all nonprofits is a mixture of zero effect for “true”
nonprofits and a positive effect for for-profits in disguise.  We cannot, however, reject the
hypothesis that some nonprofits are for-profits in disguise because they may account for a small
proportion of all nonprofits.
 5.  Mixed Oligopoly
A complete theory needs to specify the objective functions of firms and the mechanism
by which the market mix is maintained.  A fully developed theory would also explain why some
industries, such as health and education, support government, for-profit, and nonprofit
production, while others industries exhibit only one or two types of producers.  A start has been
made on models of mixed oligopoly incorporating public (either welfare or revenue maximizing)
and for-profit agents.  (see e.g.,  Cremer, Marchand et al. 1989; De Fraja and Delbono 1989)
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7However, there is no theory incorporating the three types of producer, so we rely on intuition as
to how these different species of nonprofits should be expected to respond to shifts in the
composition of their competitors.
Several theories explain how nonprofits and for-profits can continue to occupy the same
market.  The first and most common one is that where there are informational asymmetries
between providers and recipients of health care (Arrow 1963), quality of care cannot be fully
contracted, and consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences and/or informational
disadvantage.  (See, e.g., Hansmann 1980; Ben-Ner and Hoomissen 1991; Hirth 1999; Glaeser
and Shleifer 2001)  Therefore, for-profits and nonprofits offer different quality services and
possibly price them differently (where price should be construed as including various
nonpecuniary compensation mechanisms, e.g., how much emphasis is placed on the nature of
conversations with patients).   This type of model underlies many other discussions in health
economics, including discussions of insurance or regulation.  It is unclear, however, how much
control over quality providers exert or the power of these incentives — some studies show no, or
only very small, responses to large incentives, with rewards going to those who already exhibited
high quality before the incentives were implemented. (See e.g., Rosenthal, Frank et al. 2005;
Rosenthal and Frank 2006; Epstein 2007)
The second idea about how ownership mix is maintained is that nonprofits (who are
assumed to enjoy a cost advantage over for-profits) are in short supply; the number of altruists
who found and run nonprofits is fixed, while for-profit entrepreneurs are in abundance.
(Lakdawalla and Philipson 2005)  In this type of model, the marginal firm is a for-profit, so
equilibrium is determined by for-profit behavior, with some constraints imposed by the presence
of nonprofits.  This is the only model that does not require some heterogeneity in patients.
However, it imposes a very stringent constraint on hospital managers, dividing them into two
types with one in infinite abundance and one with a finite population.
The third is the Hirth (1997; 1999) model in which two types of firms – one with for-
profit objectives, the other with altruistic objectives – both adopt nonprofit status.  That both
types incorporate under the same status reduces the signal quality of organizational type.  This
situation creates an equilibrium where customers cannot be sure of receiving higher quality care
at a nonprofit, though it may be higher in expectation, and for-profits offering a “price”
9
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8advantage over nonprofits.  Patients who differ in risk aversion or information sets choose one
type of hospital over another, and both types are present in equilibrium.
The fourth is that there are different financial advantages enjoyed by the two types, where
for-profits have access to equity and nonprofits may have lower tax expenses, so that one type
may be more or less advantaged in different places or different times, see e.g., Hansmann (1987).
If in some markets the financial advantage switches between the organizational forms over time,
both types may be observed at a point in time if the future expected return to each justifies their
continuous operation.
A similar pattern of fluctuating fortunes is implied by Pauly and Redisch, in that there is
no difference in objectives between for-profits or nonprofits, but there are costs and benefits
associated with each type (a physicians’ cooperative organized as a nonprofit that cannot
distribute profits per se may be forced to “pay” doctors in perquisites or other non-cash
compensation).  If there is heterogeneity in doctors’ preferences, or differences in costs and
benefits in different places or different times, both types of profit-seeking firms will be observed.
Finally, if nonprofits exist because they offer different goods than other types (Rose-
Ackerman 1996), then they are actually in different markets and the puzzle of why different
hospital types co-exist within markets dissolves.  There is some evidence for this explanation in
hospital markets.  Horwitz (2005a; 2007), for example, has found that medical service provision
varies significantly by ownership type.  This finding implies two distinct types of product
differentiation.  First, for example, hospital types specialize in various services (e.g., some
government hospitals offer psychiatric emergency care and for-profits in the market do not).
One could also consider the different bundles of services offered at hospitals to be different
goods.  Second, one could understand the product offered by hospitals as health care, a
multidimensional commodity.  Different patients, or their doctors and insurers, have different
preferences over the mix of services and service attributes offered by hospitals.  Consumers may
sort by hospital type based on their preferences for quality, quantity, and hotel services.
These notions of product differentiation lead one to think of a model of monopolistic
competition, in which the interaction between for-profits and nonprofits is concentrated in the
arena of defining a hospital’s unique position in the product space.  This model does not,
however, address the central question of why nonprofits and for-profits would compete in this
10
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9way.  Nor does it suggest the optimal level of quality and quantity of medical services, a
particularly difficult question where there is imperfect information as in medical services
markets.  But the idea of product differentiation does suggest that nonprofit output decisions
would not depend on market mix.  Nonprofits would simply specialize in the some types of
services and not in other types of services, regardless of the number of for-profit competitors.
We prefer the first of these models of self-sustaining market mix, relying on the
heterogeneity of preferences among consumers, though each probably captures important
elements of the interactions among hospitals in a market.  Another model which should not be
neglected is simple inertia—regardless of the relative advantages of various organizational
forms, or large negative profit margins, many hospitals are slow to close.  Nonprofits may see
perpetual operation as part of their mission, even if times have changed irrevocably.  Hansmann
et al. (2003) have found that secular nonprofits are less responsive to declines in demand than
government or religious nonprofits; for-profits are the most responsive.  There are likely other
behavioral economics stories at play, including a process of institutional isomorphism that
induces nonprofits and for-profits in the same market to behave much the same regardless of
their true objectives, which complicate interpretation of these results as tests of competing
theories of rational behavior.
B.  Previous Empirical Research on Ownership Mix
Related empirical research focuses on two questions:  1) Does firm behavior depend on
the ownership of its competitors?  2) What is the primary direction of influence between for-
profit and nonprofit firms?  Although few studies examine the relationship among firm type,
market mix, and medical service provision, the available evidence suggests that the presence of
for-profit hospitals in a market is associated with greater responsiveness to financial incentives
among nonprofits in the same market.  Nonprofits in relatively high for-profit hospital
penetration markets are more likely than other types to provide profitable services (Hughes and
Luft 1990; Horwitz 2007), to avoid unprofitable patients (Schlesinger, Bentkover et al. 1987;
Schlesinger, Dorwart et al. 1997a), and to spend less on admitted cardiac patients (Ettner and
Hermann 1987; Kessler and McClellan 2002).  They are also more responsive to profit-making
opportunities (Cutler and Horwitz 2000; Duggan 2000; Silverman and Skinner 2004).
11
Horwitz and Nichols:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007
10
Some scholars, however, explain these differences as evidence of market selection rather
than ownership.  For example, Norton and Staiger (1994) find that conditional on location,
nonprofits provide similar amounts of charity care to for-profits, but for-profits differentially
locate where there is less demand for such care.  Similarly, studying three markets, McClellan
and Staiger (2000) find that for-profits systematically locate in markets with lower total quality.
Scholars also consider the direction of influence among firm types within mixed markets.
Some claim that nonprofits influence for-profits.  Hirth (1999), described above, shows that
competition from altruistic nonprofits can raise quality among competing for-profit and
nonprofits that adopt for-profit objectives alike.  Several others have argued, without systematic
evidence in support, that nonprofits influence for-profit competitors through some form of
standard setting.  They may, for example, define consumer and community expectations
regarding service provision such as charity care, or stimulate non-price competition such as
competing over reputation for contribution to the community. (Marsteller, Bovberg et al. 1998;
Clement, White et al. 2002)  Hansmann (1980) reasons that a nonprofit culture in older,
established industries such as the hospital industry deters profiteering among nonprofits,
immunizing them from for-profit influence.
Other scholars identify the opposite relationship—for-profits influencing nonprofits.
Hughes et al. (1990) predict that nonprofit hospitals with for-profit neighbors will feel
competitively threatened and, therefore, will be more likely than other nonprofits to offer
profitable services and less likely to offer unprofitable services.  They also predict that nonprofits
view local government hospitals both as complementary institutions, thus allowing the nonprofit
to avoid unprofitable services, and as uncompetitive, thus allowing them to offer profitable
services.  Their results, albeit for only two medical services, support their predictions.  Based on
two case studies, Cutler and Horwitz (2000) hypothesize that nonprofit and government hospitals
copy the behavior of new for-profit entrants in a hospital market.  Finally, Clement and co-
authors (2002) show that as nonprofits provide more charity care, for-profits provide less in
mixed markets.
Still others contend that there should be no influence of for-profits on nonprofits or vice
versa. According to Lakdawalla and Philipson (2005) because for-profits have higher operating
costs and no endowments, they are the marginal firms and, therefore, the only firms responding
12
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to market changes.  This result depends on several strong assumptions, such as a finite supply of
altruistic entrepreneurs and an infinite supply of profit-seeking entrepreneurs.  Further, the result
is not robust to changes in the theoretical model, such as allowing the supply of both profit-
seeking and altruistic entrepreneurs to vary with market characteristics or fixing the supply of
both entrepreneurial types.
 Finally, Santerre and Vernon (2005) attempt to identify the efficient ownership mix.
Relying on Grabowski and Hirth (2002), they assert that nonprofits encourage for-profits to
become more trustworthy and for-profits encourage nonprofits to become more efficient.  Thus,
they assume that ownership influences run in both directions.  They further assume that
nonprofits face relatively high demand because they have higher quality, but offer relatively low
supply because their relatively low efficiency leads to higher costs.  To identify which effect
dominates they regress quantity (e.g., admissions, surgeries, emergency visits, and others) on
nonprofit and government hospital market share, and other variables that influence demand.
Finding negative coefficients on nonprofit ownership in almost all tests, they conclude that the
quality benefit is less than the inefficiency cost associated with nonprofit ownership and,
therefore, there are too many nonprofit hospitals.  This conclusion, however, is not supported by
their theory – if consumers value quantity and quality, then lower quantity and higher quality
could generate greater consumer surplus, and there could well be an inefficiently low number of
nonprofits.
III.  Data and Empirical Strategy
A.  Data
Annual data (1988 through 2005) on hospital characteristics (e.g., beds, admissions,
ownership status, teaching status, and medical services) are from the American Hospital
Association’s Annual Surveys of Hospitals (AHA).  We include all non-rural, non-federal
general medical and surgical hospitals in the United States.  We examine every acute and post-
acute medical service reported in the surveys.  The AHA surveys include approximately 80
service questions from which we excluded questions about facilities, non-medical services, and
duplicate questions.  A list of included services and summary statistics are in Table 2.
The AHA data have some limitations.  First, they are self-reported and not independently
verified.  However, there is no a priori reason to suspect that the data reliability is correlated
13
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with ownership or market type.  Further, general medical and surgical hospitals exhibit a high
response rate.  In 2003, for-example, it was 86.3 percent.  Second, the survey format has changed
slightly over the years.  From 1988-1993, the survey asked hospitals to choose whether a service
(e.g., open heart surgery) was offered at the hospital, another hospital, or not available (allowing
the hospital three possible answers), and from 1993-2005 to answer “yes” to each question if the
service was offered at a 1) hospital or subsidiary, 2) another system location, 3) network, or 4)
joint venture (allowing for 16 possible answers).  To ensure that the coding is consistent over
time, we compared the responses in 1993, when the surveys included both question types.  For
all years we converted the answers into a dichotomous variable representing whether the hospital
itself offered the service.
Third, the data suffer from missing values, particularly in the later years, and the non-
respondents were disproportionately for-profit.  Of the roughly 46,075 observations in the
sample, before filling in missing values, approximately three percent of nonprofit, five percent of
government, and 17 percent of for-profit hospitals did not report whether they offered open-heart
surgery in 1988.  By 2005, those percentages were about 12 percent for nonprofit, 11 percent for
government, and 26 percent for for-profit hospitals.  The numbers, however, are considerably
lower for nonprofit and government hospitals after weighting by annual admissions.  We
imputed missing values using data from the years surrounding the missing year.  Generally fewer
than five percent of observations were imputed for each service.
Fourth, the AHA has a self-reported variable for whether a hospital is a general medical
and surgical or other type (e.g., a psychiatric hospital, specialty hospital, or children’s hospital).
Approximately 350 hospitals non-rural hospitals report changes in their self-reported
designation.  We conducted additional research on about 100 of these hospitals by searching the
hospital website, local newspapers, state government reports, and contacting the hospital directly
to determine which value was correct; we excluded 48 of these hospitals from the sample
because they were not general hospitals.   We recoded the remaining 267 hospitals with varying
designations (approximately five percent) by using the modal response during all years, therefore
only using those hospitals that report being a general medical and surgical hospital in the
majority of study years.
We constructed demographic controls using tract-level data from the 1990 and 2000 U.S.
Census.  HMO penetration data (1990 through 2001) are derived from the National Directory of
14
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HMOs (published annually by the Group Health Association of America) and Interstudy.  Baker
(1997) provides details on the construction of HMO market share estimates.  We constructed the
hospital system membership variable from three sources:  the AHA and databases constructed by
Madison (2004) for 1988-1998 and by Dafny and Dranove (2006) for 1988-2000.
We constructed hospital operating margins using the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services’ Healthcare Cost Report Information System (HCRIS).  The HCRIS data are updated
quarterly and we used data from the March, 2006 version for years 1988 through 2004,
excluding 2005 from the analysis because the data were incomplete.  There are some limitations
to the data, suggested by the fact that within a single hospital operating margins vary
considerably over time.  We excluded nearly one percent (330) of the observations because they
showed contractual allowances – the difference between hospital charges and amounts realizable
from third party payers under contractual agreements – to be larger than total patient revenues.
We also excluded an additional five percent (2,297) of the observations because they were
missing at least one variable necessary to calculate the operating margin.
We developed a database of precise hospital locations from several sources, starting with
addresses from the AHA database, filling in missing addresses through internet searches and
telephone calls to the hospital or the current resident of the building that housed the closed
hospital.  We then used geocoding software to match the addresses to precise longitudes and
latitudes, matching 77 percent during the first run and slightly over 10 percent more after
resolving name conflicts or hand-matching the addresses with the software.  We identified the
remaining locations by employing various methods including using Federal Aviation
Administration databases to identify hospital heliports and iterating between topographic maps to
locate the hospital visually and mapping programs to find the street location.
B.  Empirical Strategy and Models
1.  Overview and Service Profitability
Examining medical services provision is useful for several reasons.  Service provision
decisions suggest the type of patients, doctors, and payers whom hospitals wish to attract.  By
examining multiple services, rather than concentrating on one, we are able to establish the
patterns by which hospitals decide to provide services.  Comparing services also allows us to
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identify hospitals’ relative responsiveness to financial incentives.  Interactions between medical
providers and their patients may also be influenced less directly by a hospital’s ownership form
or market environment than by whether and how those factors determine the services that
hospitals offer, particularly since hospital administrators can more readily control service
offerings than ownership status or market environment.
In total, we examine 45 individual medical services to test whether offerings differ by the
interaction between hospital ownership and market type (i.e., high and low for-profit hospital
market penetration).   We then sort those services into three profitability categories – those with
relatively high, relatively low, and variable profitability.   Our main method,  following Horwitz
(2007), assigns relative profitability based on several sources including peer-reviewed research,
interviews (with, e.g., hospital administrators, doctors, and policymakers), analyses of patients’
socioeconomic or insurance status, Medicare payment reports, physician salaries for related
services, and trade publications.  Although we summarize some of the designations in Table 2, a
detailed report explaining the profitability sorting is available online. (Horwitz 2005b)
Second, as a check on the first method, we categorize relative profitability from the data
itself.  We assume that for-profits are more likely than government hospitals to offer relatively
profitable services and less like to do otherwise.  Using results from equation (1) below,
including all the listed control variables, we classify services as profitable if for-profit hospitals
are more likely to offer a service than government hospitals in more than 10 percent of the study
years and less likely to do so in no more than 10 percent of the study years.  We similarly
categorize services as unprofitable if for-profit hospitals are less likely to offer a service than
government hospitals in more than 10 percent of the study years and more likely to do so in no
more than 10 percent of the study years.  If for-profits are both more likely to offer a service in
more than 10 percent of the study years and less likely to do so in 10 percent of the study years,
we classify the service as variable.  Otherwise, we classified the service as indeterminate.   For
services that the first method identifies as unprofitable, the second method quite consistently also
identifies them as unprofitable.  The approaches are less consistent for services identified as
profitable by the first method.  (See Table 2, Column 2)
Here we report in detail on representative services for each of three categories – relatively
profitable, relatively unprofitable, and variably profitable services.  In the relatively profitable
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category we consider open-heart surgery, which was among the most consistently and
unambiguously profitable services over the study period partly because of the well-insured
nature of the patient pool (Cutler, McClellan et al. 2000) and the fact that as the real price of
bypass surgery increased during the 1980s and 1990s, the costs were either flat or fell during the
same period (Cutler, McClellan et al. 2001; Cutler and Huckman 2003).  We also include
magnetic resonance imaging technology (MRI) because it is representative of an elective unit
that is often provided by free-standing, for-profit businesses independent of hospitals.
We report on two relatively unprofitable services, HIV/AIDS treatment and psychiatric
emergency care.  During the 1980s and 1990s, HIV-positive and AIDS patients were
unprofitable patients to treat because almost all community health insurers rated them as
uninsurable, although some states forbade HIV antibody testing for underwriting purposes.
(Pascal, Cvitanic et al. 1989)  Further, Medicaid reimbursement, the largest source of AIDS/HIV
treatment payments in the 1990s (Westmoreland 1999), did not typically cover the cost of
treatment. (Pascal, Cvitanic et al. 1989)  Psychiatric services were generally unprofitable over
the entire study period, and have become more unprofitable in the latter years, as insurers cut
back reimbursement.  Hospital-based, psychiatric emergency services are relatively unprofitable
for several reasons including the emergency room setting, the uncertain and often low level of
reimbursement, and the poor, poorly insured, and sick nature of the patient pool. (Shwed 1980;
Melnick, Serrato et al. 1989; Deloitte & Touche 1990; Woodward, Epstein et al. 1997; Dhossche
and Ghani 1998; Gentry and Penrod 2000; Tye 2001)
Finally, home health care and skilled nursing facilities exhibited variable profit-making
opportunities over the study period, being relatively profitable in roughly 1993 through 1997, but
neither unambiguously profitable nor unprofitable before or after this heyday.  Legal challenges
ensuring Medicare would reimburse these services were resolved by the early 1990s, and they
became quite profitable for hospitals that newly entered the post-acute market and hospitals that
unbundled acute and post-acute services.  With passage of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act,
Medicare payments were reduced and spending on post-acute care fell by a factor of two.  (Liu,
Gage et al. 1999; Newhouse 2001; Newhouse 2002)
2.  Market Definitions
There are several conventional methods for defining market boundaries and market share.
Because each has strengths and weaknesses, we perform numerous analyses using both
17
Horwitz and Nichols:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007
16
alternative measures of hospital market and for-profit market share.  We summarize the
approaches here and provide details, including comparisons of the methods, in Appendix A and
Appendix B.  Our main results use a new “distance-weighted” measure of the percent of other
hospitals that are for-profit, averaging across all hospitals in the country.  For each hospital in
our sample in each year, we assign a weight to each other hospital in the country, weighting by
its admissions divided by the square of one plus a constant times the distance squared.  This
method places more reasonable relative weights on points of different distances from the hospital
than does the more conventional reciprocal of squared distance.  We fix the constant used in the
weighting such that the method yields similar results to those of actual patient markets as
reported by Gresenz (2004).2
We then identify a hospital as being in a high for-profit (HiFP) market if its market is
more than 15% for-profits, and in a low for-profit (LoFP) market if it faces less than a 10% for-
profit market share.  Roughly 60-65 percent of the hospitals in the sample are in low for-profit
penetration markets and 25-30 percent are in high for-profit penetration markets in the years
under study.  The median of for-profit market share is close to 10 percent for each definition of
for-profit share, and more than a quarter of hospitals have more than a 15 percent for-profit share
in their market, but different definitions of for-profit market share produce different
classifications. We experimented with alternative cutoffs, including the top third and bottom
third of for-profit market shares, and the results were insensitive to specification differences.
In the first set of alternative market tests, we identified a hospital’s market as a disk with
an approximately 15-mile radius centered on the hospital’s location.  This “fixed-radius”
approach puts a weight on potential competitors that decays smoothly to zero at 30 miles (i.e.,
when the distance from the central hospital to its competitor is twice the radius of the disk, the
overlap is zero).  Because we identify the hospital location by its longitude and latitude, rather
than situating it at the centroid of the zip code in which it operates, we avoid some of the
imprecision commonly found in the hospital ownership research.  Neither the distance-weighted
2 We chose not to use measures of market that depend on the hospital’s choice variables, such as by varying the
potential geographic area from which a hospital draws its admissions.  While such measures have the benefit of
better identifying the area from which a hospital draws its actual patients, the actual patients served are not identical
to a hospital’s market, which is conceptually closer to the potential pool of patients faced by each hospital.  If a
hospital changes its product mix, discontinuing one service and instituting another, the actual patients served might
change radically, and the geographic area might shift suddenly.  The potential patient pool is unchanged in this
hypothetical example, and the reaction functions of hospitals in competition, and their behavior in real markets, are
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nor the fixed-radii measure of for-profit share accounts for barriers to travel such as mountains or
rivers.
We use a third market definition often used in health economics research, MSA.
(Chernew 1995; Santerre and Vernon 2005).  This approach incorporates a notion of
topographical features and travel time because MSAs are defined by the Census to encompass an
area within which individuals are likely to commute to work.  Further, MSAs are fairly similar to
Hospital Referral Regions (HRR), which represent regional health care markets for tertiary
medical care as defined by the Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare.  Over 65 percent of HRRs include
only 1 MSA and 88 percent include 1 or 2 MSAs.  The results were not sensitive to these three
alternative market definitions.
We also vary the definition of for-profit market share, by using the first observed market
share (which is not sensitive to entry and exit by other hospitals over the 18 years of data in our
sample), and find similar results.  Further, we alternatively include and exclude each individual
hospital from its own market to construct each of the for-profit market penetration variables.
Results are somewhat sensitive to whether a hospital’s own ownership and admissions are
included in its market definition, in the sense that patterns of predicted probabilities look
qualitatively noisier and less sensible, but here we report only results using not-i market
definitions, i.e., those that do not allow a hospital’s own ownership and admissions from defining
the hospital's market type.
3.  Primary Econometric Model
(a) Hospital Level Specification
We ask whether hospital types offer different types of services in different market types
measured by for-profit penetration, modeling the effect of ownership mix on service provision by
hospital type as follows:
(1) E(ServiceProvided)it = Φ[ βo + β1Fit + β2Yt + β3Yt*Fit + β4FPMarketit + β5
Fit*FPMarketit + β6Yt*Fit*FPMarketit + β7Hit + β8Dit + β9HMOit + β10HHIit]
where F is a vector of indicator variables for nonprofit, for-profit, or government
ownership; and Y is a vector of indicator variables for year.  FPMarket is a dummy variable that
identifies high for-profit markets.  H is a vector of hospital characteristic variables including
determined by characteristics of potential patients as much as by actual patients.
19
Horwitz and Nichols:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007
18
hospital size (measured by quintiles of total hospital admissions), and teaching status (measured
by two variables: 1) whether the hospital has a residency training approval by Accreditation
Council for Graduate Medical Education, and 2) whether the hospital is a member of the Council
of Teaching Hospitals of the Association of American Medical Colleges).
We include system membership because individual hospital service provision depends on
system decisions, and the probability of system membership is greater for for-profit and religious
hospitals than others. (Madison 2004).  System membership may also be correlated with the
measures that we test, such as offering cardiac care, although the direction of the correlation is
unclear. (Madison 2004).  Finally, systems may acquire hospitals that provide profitable services
so we introduce another endogeneity problem.  Therefore, H includes a binary variable for
whether a hospital is a member of a hospital system, defined as the maximum of two indicator
variables based on AHA data:  whether the hospital has a non-missing system identification
number and whether the hospital reports belonging to a system.  In some cases, we impute
system membership for hospitals based on corrected system membership data assembled by
Madison (2004) or Dafny and Dranove (2006).
D is a vector of demographic variables measuring the characteristics of a hospital’s
potential patients.  These include population size, ten categories of age, seven categories of
education, five categories of race, sex, marital status by sex, employed persons by eleven
categories of industry (as a proxy for insurance status), ten categories of household income,
income per capita, and twelve categories of travel time to work (as a proxy of willingness to
drive various distances to the hospital).  Because the demographic data are from the years 1990
and 2000 only, we filled the missing years by linearly interpolating and extrapolating the natural
log of each control variable, amounting to imposing a constant percentage change per year in
each population type within each hospital’s market.
We compiled these data from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses by averaging across all tracts
in the states and DC, using weights that vary inversely with the distance squared from hospital i
to the centroid of each census tract.  All distances are calculated using an accurate ellipsoidal
model of the Earth's surface, using the program (Nichols 2007).  The results are not sensitive to
the specifics of weighting choices.  This is a general feature of averaging demographic
characteristics across fairly large geographical areas.  Goody (1993) notes that in a study of rural
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hospital markets varying the market definition did not affect mean socioeconomic variable
values at the zip code level.
HMO is market penetration of health maintenance organizations, a measure commonly
used as a proxy for financial pressure in a market.  We include this variable because competitive
pressure has been found to explain some variation in nonprofit behavior such as charity care
provision by general hospitals (Gruber 1994; Mann, Melnick et al. 1995) and psychiatric
hospitals (Schlesinger, Dorwart et al. 1997b).  Further, areas with more for-profits have slightly
lower HMO enrollment than areas with fewer for-profit hospitals. (Kessler and McClellan 2002)
During our study period, there was considerable hospital market consolidation, with
many markets reduced to monopolies, duopolies, or triopolies (Gaynor 2006).  To ensure that we
estimate the effects of ownership mix rather than market concentration, we include two measures
of market concentration.  First, we include a variable (HHI) that measures market concentration
using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index which is the sum of squares of each hospital’s share of
total admissions within each MSA in each year.  Although we hypothesize that ownership of a
hospital affects the service provision of its competitors, we do not interact ownership type with
HHI because there is no a priori reason to believe that the incentive to exploit market power
differs by form.  In theory, although the particular motivation for exploiting market power may
vary by ownership type (e.g., earning profits to distribute to owners or furthering nonprofit
goals), both types of firms benefit from exploiting market power (Philipson and Posner 2006).
In a simulation, Gaynor and Vogt (2003) show no difference in the propensity of nonprofit and
for-profit hospitals to exploit market power.  Abraham et al. (2005) find that entry of a second or
third hospital in a market leads to a convergence in competitive conduct, including an increase in
the quantity of admissions in a market, but find no effect of further entry.  We therefore include
three indicator variables measuring whether the MSA has 2, 3, 4, or 5 hospitals or more (the
excluded category). 3
Because the probability of a hospital offering a service is not independent from one year
to the next, we correct standard errors by clustering at the hospital level so they are robust to
arbitrary serial correlation. (Arellano 1987; Kézdi 2004; Stock and Watson 2006)   Test statistics
3 We drop the few MSAs with only one hospital because the MSA-level, for-profit market share cannot be
calculated for these MSAs.
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on joint tests when clustering at the MSA level were generally greater in absolute magnitude, and
standard errors on individual coefficients generally smaller, indicating that errors may be
negatively correlated within MSA.  Estimating standard errors, at the hospital level, therefore, is
conservative.  These cluster-robust standard errors are also robust to heteroskedasticity in errors.
By varying only the corporate form and market type of each hospital while holding the
independent variables constant (at 1994 levels), we predict the probabilities that each hospital in
each year would offer a given service.  Then we average the individual predicted probabilities to
obtain the probability that a hospital type offers a service each year.  The thought experiment is,
in short, what if all hospitals were for-profits in high for-profit markets in every year?  What if
all hospitals were non-profits in high for-profit markets in every year?  What if all hospitals were
non-profits in low for-profit markets in every year?  How would the behavior of hospitals differ
under each of these counterfactuals in different types of markets?  Conducting the empirical tests
in this manner allows us to hold constant non-ownership hospital characteristics, thus yielding
more accurate predictions of how hospitals would behave if they changed form and no other
attributes.
(b) Service Level
Instead of modeling the effect of ownership mix on provision by hospital for each of 45
services separately, we reformat the data so that each observation is of a service-hospital-year
combination, rather than a hospital-year combination, and regress provision on hospital, market
and service characteristics:
(1b) E(ServiceProvided)ijt = F[ βo + β1Fit + β2 Pjt + β3 Fit*Pjt + β4FPMarketit + β5
Fit*FPMarketit + β6 Pijt*Fit*FPMarketit + β7Hit + β8Dit + β9HMOit + β10HHIit + β11Yt]
where j indexes services and i indexes hospitals, Pjt is an indicator of profitability (0 for
an unprofitable or 1 for a profitable service in each year), and other variables are the same as in
equation 1.  The coefficients in the vector β6 are of primary interest, since they measure the
differential impact of profitability for a hospital of a given type between low and high for-profit
markets.  In this model, we have included all 39 services classified as either profitable or
unprofitable, excluding the six services we classified as indeterminate.  We coded services with
variable profitability as profitable in some years (1993 through 1997) and unprofitable in others.
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We correct standard errors by clustering at the hospital level so they are robust to
arbitrary intraclass correlation.  These cluster-robust standard errors are also robust to
heteroskedasticity in errors, and are larger on average than standard errors clustered at the
hospital-year (smaller classes) or MSA (larger classes) level, i.e. they are conservative.
4.  Fixed-effects Model
We also implement an analogous model that includes fixed-effects for each MSA.  In this model,
for-profit market share enters linearly and is interacted with hospital ownership, making year
effects common to all hospital types but allowing the effect of for-profit share on hospitals to
differ by nonprofit, for-profit, and government ownership.  Applying the fixed-effects approach
using the disk-overlap or distance-weighted methods to define for-profit market share, the model
controls for any unobserved heterogeneity at the MSA level that is fixed over time.  In this model
we also cluster at the hospital level.
Because of the limitations to this model, we do not include a variable for market fixed-
effects in the primary specification.  In a model with MSA-level fixed-effects, using the MSA-
level definition of for-profit market share to identify high for-profit markets, the effect of market
share is identified solely off changes within an MSA over time.  These changes are small and
non-randomly distributed.  Furthermore, much of the interesting variation in market share is
cross-sectional, and most of that cannot affect behavior in the fixed-effect model.  Finally, the
demographic characteristics of a city's population are accounted for by MSA fixed-effects and,
therefore, only changes in composition can be included in the model.  However, we estimated
changes across years in composition of the population from two Census years and interpolated to
all 18 study years, so the change in composition would be a noisy measure and hard to interpret
in the estimated model.  Therefore, we exclude the Census controls to account for changing
composition of the potential patient population.   Including various subsets of Census controls
made little difference to the overall pattern of estimated coefficients, but did further inflate the
variability of estimates.
5. Operating Margins
We constructed hospital operating margins from the HCRIS by dividing net income from
patient services (total patient revenue less contractual allowances less total operating expenses)
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by net patient revenues (total patient revenues less contractual allowances).  We employed the
following model
(2) Operating Marginit = βo + β1Fit + β2Yt + β3Yt*Fit + β4FPMarketPenetrationit + β5
Fit*FPMarketPenetrationit + β7Hit + β8Dit + β9HMOit + β10HHIit + e
where the variables in (2) are the same as described above in equation (1) except we use a
continuous measure of for-profit market share rather than a dichotomous variable to measure the
impact of for-profit market share.  In sensitivity tests we exclude from D the controls based on
characteristics of Census tracts.  We estimated the model both in the pooled cross-section and
using a fixed-effects specification analogous to the tests for medical service provision described
above.  In this model we cluster at the MSA level.  (Kézdi 2004; Stock and Watson 2006)  Test
statistics on joint tests when clustering at the hospital level were generally greater in absolute
magnitude, and standard errors on individual coefficients generally smaller, indicating that errors
may be positively correlated within MSA, and our estimated standard errors are conservative.
IV.  Results
A.  Medical Services
Here we present findings from the basic specification (i.e., using the distance-weighted
market measure to construct high and low for-profit penetration markets) for three service types:
relatively profitable, relatively unprofitable, and variably profitable. (Figures 1-3)  We
summarize the results for all 45 services in Table 4 and provide graphs for all results in
Appendix C.
Nonprofit hospitals in high for-profit markets are more likely to offer profitable services
than those in low for-profit penetration markets.  This can be seen best in Figure 1.  The
regression results confirm the intuition provided by the figures, showing that, on average over
the study period, nonprofits in high for-profit markets were 4.8 percentage points more likely to
offer open heart surgery than those in low for-profit penetration markets (ave p=0.000, joint
p=0.021)4.  Government hospitals followed a similar pattern (4.8 percentage points, ave p=0.158,
joint p=0.603).  For-profit hospitals show a different pattern, although the results were largely
4 We present results from two types of hypothesis tests, whether 1) the coefficients on hospital type*market type are
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insignificant and, therefore, could indicate no difference at all.  For-profits were less likely to
offer open heart surgery in highly for-profit markets (-1.7 percentage points, ave p=0.556, joint
p=0.519).  The results for MRI provision were similar.  Nonprofits in high for-profit markets
were more likely to offer MRI services than those in low for-profit penetration markets (5.8
percentage points, ave p=0.000, joint p=0.001).  The results for government (7.1 percentage
points, ave p=0.032, joint p=.194) and for-profit (1.1 percentage points, ave p=0.474, joint
p=0.070) hospitals were similar.
Nonprofit hospitals were systematically less likely to provide unprofitable services in for-
profit markets than in other markets.  Figure 2 for psychiatric emergency care and HIV/AIDS
treatment illustrates the results.  On average over the study period, nonprofits in high for-profit
markets were less likely to offer HIV/AIDS treatment (-5.9 percentage points, ave p=0.002, joint
p=0.016) and psychiatric emergency care (-6.0 percentage points, ave p=0.001, joint p=0.009)
than those in low for-profit penetration markets.  Nonprofit hospitals were more likely to offer
only one of the unprofitable services – burn care – in for-profit markets than in others and the
results for this service were statistically insignificant.  For-profit and government hospitals
followed a similar pattern in high for-profit markets but the results were insignificant.
These findings are confirmed by the results for services in which profitability varied
dramatically during the study period, the post-acute services home health and skilled nursing.
When the services were most profitable, from 1993 through 1997, nonprofit hospitals were more
likely to offer them in the high than the low for-profit penetration markets.  (Home Health: ave
p=0.0302, joint p=.0427; Skilled Nursing:  ave p=0.0005, joint p=0.0048)  Yet when these
services became less profitable, nonprofits reduced their likelihood of providing post-acute
services more dramatically in high than low for-profit penetration markets.  The results for for-
profit hospitals, although weaker, are similar.  The results for government hospitals are
ambiguous.  As can be seen in Table 4, these patterns are quite strongly confirmed by results for
the other services using the Horwitz (2005b) classification of relative profitability and,
particularly for the relatively unprofitable services, using the data-generated classification of
relative profitability described above.
different on average over the study period and 2) these coefficients are jointly different.
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We also attempted to produce a single coefficient to represent the effect of the
ownership-market interaction on service provision.  These specifications, estimated at the service
level, strongly support the findings in which we estimated each service at the hospital level
separately.  The effect of service profitability on the likelihood of a nonprofit hospital offering a
service in a low for-profit market is large and significantly negative (see Table 5b, row 4); the
effect of profitability on the likelihood of a nonprofit hospital offering a service in a high for-
profit market is positive and significantly different from zero (see Table 5b, sum rows 4&10).
Consistent with our findings that nonprofit hospitals are more likely to offer profitable
services in high than in low for-profit markets, we estimate a large positive coefficient on "High
for-profit market X nonprofit X profitable service" (Table 5b, row 10), which measures the
differential probability of a nonprofit offering a profitable service (relative to an unprofitable
one) in a high for-profit market.  Using the distance-weighted measure of market share, the
coefficient 0.432 corresponds to an odds ratio of 1.54,  suggesting that the average estimated
effect of a higher for-profit share on a nonprofit hospitals' propensity to offer profitable services
or avoid unprofitable services is quite large (Table 5b, column 3, row 10).
B.  Operating Margins
Estimates from both pooled and fixed-effects specifications under various definitions of
for-profit market penetration do not show any effect of market type on nonprofit hospital
margins.  Nor does there appear to be any difference between nonprofit and for-profit margins
within high for-profit markets.  In each of the specifications, reported in Table 5, for-profit
hospitals have higher margins than comparable nonprofits in higher for-profit share markets.
The only statistically significant result is under the model using the continuous measure of for-
profit share, which shows an effect of about 27 cents on the dollar, but even this result is only
marginally significantly different from zero (t=1.69).
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C. Alternative Explanations, Specifications, and Sensitivity Tests
These results from the main specification may not differentiate between two possible
reasons for observed differences: 1) as we suggest, nonprofit hospitals may offer different
services in markets with relatively high or low for-profit penetration or, alternatively, 2)
unobserved characteristics about particular markets may both disproportionately attract for-profit
hospitals and cause a relatively high level of profitable service provision.
There are good reasons to suspect that the former, rather than the latter, is the better
explanation.  If the unobserved characteristic explaining both higher levels of for-profit hospital
market share and profitable service offerings is related to differences in demand that are
correlated with population characteristics – as it is, for example, in the case of demand for
charity care (Clement, White et al. 2002) – the extremely detailed demographic control variables
address some of this concern.  Further, there is some research suggesting that medical service
provision does not drive the mix of hospitals in a market.  Santerre and Vernon (2005), for
example, note that market shares change little from year to year; Grabowski and Hirth (2002)
claim that the share of nonprofit hospitals is primarily related to historical factors such as the age
of the city and to characteristics of its populace, such as levels of charitable activity.
A prominent thread in the empirical research, however, suggests that for-profit hospitals
choose location differently from nonprofit hospitals.  Norton and Staiger (1994) demonstrate that
nonprofits are more likely than for-profits to serve disadvantaged populations, both in terms of
types of health services demanded and ability to pay for health services based on income and
insurance coverage.  Kessler and McClellan (2002)  show “that market and other hospital
characteristics are correlated with hospital ownership status.  For example, for-profit areas are
substantially more competitive than non-profit areas (less likely to be very concentrated, i.e., in
the top HHI quartile), have higher rates of bed capacity, and slightly lower rates of HMO
enrollment.”  They further argue that there is substantial selection by health status.  Patients who
go to public hospitals tend to be much sicker.  This bias, however, is at odds with the finding that
public hospitals differ from for-profit hospitals in the provision of profitable services; we would
expect government hospitals to offer more high-tech, invasive services because they serve the
patients who most need them.  These services tend to be relatively profitable.  Likewise, for-
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profit hospitals should be less averse to offering emergency services, since healthier patients
make emergency rooms less unprofitable.
In addition to controlling for differences in the populations served by different hospital
types by using the detailed Census controls described above, we employ three other approaches
to dealing with possible endogeneity:  1) altering the market penetration definition, 2) altering
the market definition, and 3) employing a fixed-effects model.
1.  Market Penetration Definition
In an additional set of specifications, we define market type (high for-profit market v.
other markets) based on the for-profit market share faced by the hospital in the first year it is
observed.  Since hospitals enter markets throughout the study period, the initial year market for-
profit concentration faced by nonprofit hospitals differs from the current-year concentration, in
some cases substantially.  The results, however, differ only modestly in most specifications and
for most services.  This suggests that our basic specification does not suffer from endogeneity
from selective entry by for-profit hospitals (e.g., for-profits entering where existing provision of
profitable services is low relative to other markets).
2.  Alternative Market Definitions:  Fixed Radii and MSAs
Instead of weighting the contribution of each hospital to market structure proportional to
its total admissions, and inversely by its distance from hospital i, one can imagine weighting
each hospital proportional to admissions within a given geographical area such as Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSAs).  One might also calculate disks of fixed radius, e.g., distances
commonly found in the literature such as 10 or 15 miles, and weight nearby hospitals'
contributions to market structure by proportion of overlap of its disk with hospital i's disk.
Analyses using the MSA-level and disk-overlap measures of for-profit market share produce
notably similar results to our basic distance-weighted measure.  The correlations in market share
are also quite high, as shown in Appendices A and B.
3.  Fixed-Effects Model
The fixed-effects model offers weak confirmation of the results in the basic specification.
The results, reported in Appendix D, suggest that nonprofit hospitals are increasingly likely to
offer cardiac services (angioplasty and cardiac catheterization labs, but not open heart surgery or
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cardiac intensive care beds) and MRIs as for-profit market share increases.  On the contrary, they
are decreasingly likely to offer certified trauma care and psychiatric emergency services as for-
profit market penetration increases.  However, almost none of these results are significant,
perhaps because the within-MSA cross-time variation in market shares is minuscule compared
with cross-sectional variation in market shares.  The fixed-effects results for government
hospitals are puzzling.  Government hospitals seem more likely to offer both relatively profitable
and unprofitable services as for-profit market penetration increases.  Finally, for-profit hospitals
show no discernable tendency.
VI. Conclusions
There is a strong and systematic relationship among hospital ownership, ownership mix
in the market, and medical service provision.  Nonprofit hospitals located in markets with high
for-profit penetration are more likely to offer relatively profitable services than those in low for-
profit penetration markets.  With the exception of one tested service (burn care), nonprofits are
less likely to offer every unprofitable service in high, compared to low for-profit markets.
Perhaps the most convincing evidence for the effect of market mix is the results for home health
and skilled nursing, post-acute services that were first ambiguously profitable, then profitable,
then less profitable again.  During the most profitable period, nonprofits were more likely to
offer them in high, compared to low for-profit markets.  During less profitable periods,
depending on the specification, there was either no discernable difference or more dramatic exit
among nonprofits in for-profit markets.
We find no systematic effect of market mix on government and for-profit hospital service
offerings.  The results show that government hospitals may follow a similar pattern to nonprofits,
but the effect is much smaller and few results are statistically significant.  Although for-profit
hospitals are somewhat less likely to offer many of the tested services in markets with high,
compared to low, for-profit market share, these results are generally insignificant as well.
That there is essentially no difference in for-profit or government hospital behavior in
low versus high for-profit markets suggests that the differences we find in nonprofit hospital
behavior are not entirely driven by unmodeled market differences.  More specifically, these
results can be interpreted as a difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of market mix on
nonprofit service provision because the estimate of for-profit (or government) behavior to be
29
Horwitz and Nichols:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007
28
subtracted from the nonprofit difference is essentially zero. These patterns are especially clear in
the case of home health, where nonprofits were significantly more likely to offer the service in
high for-profit markets in the profitable years (1993 to 1997) but the difference disappears after
1998, and for-profit and government (while clearly responding to incentives) exhibit no real
differences by for-profit market share.   The results for skilled nursing facilities are a bit more
difficult to interpret this way since, while we find no effect of market mix on government
hospitals, we find that for-profits in high for-profit markets are more likely than others to offer
skilled nursing during the service’s most profitable period.
 The patterns we identify here cannot establish a causal effect, but they do suggest that
the ownership mix in a market influences nonprofit behavior in important decisions about
whether to offer a service.  The thought experiment of exogenously changing the ownership of a
typical for-profit to a nonprofit or vice versa cannot be duplicated in real data, so the relevant
counterfactuals cannot be examined.  Nonetheless, the observed patterns are more consistent
with some theories of the nonprofit firm than others.  Table 6 summarizes some intuitive
interpretations of existing theories of nonprofit hospitals’ objectives, suggesting what these
theories would predict for hospitals operating in low for-profit and high for-profit markets.
Finding that firm types behave quite differently from each other, our examination implies
that the Pauly-Redisch profit-maximization model does not accurately describe the hospital
market.  Identifying differences in behavior by ownership type alone, however, does not rule out
a hybrid model, where some nonprofits are profit-seekers.  Nor can they distinguish between
models of own-output or market-output maximization.  Our main empirical results concerning
the interaction between ownership, market mix, and service provision help in this regard.  Rather
than compensating for any deficiencies in service provision by neighboring for-profits as a
market-output model (Weisbrod) would predict, we observe that nonprofit behavior becomes
more like for-profit behavior in the presence of a higher for-profit share.  These results are most
consistent with either an own-output model (Newhouse) or a model in which at least some
nonprofits maximize own-output even while others are maximizing profits (Hirth).
Based on our results concerning hospital margins, we favor the Newhouse model to the
Hirth model.  Although market mix may affect service offerings under both models, a shift in
for-profit market share should not affect nonprofit hospitals' profit margins if they are all
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maximizing output subject to a budget constraint.  The Hirth model suggests, however, that
profit-maximizing firms should earn higher profits when facing less competition from output-
maximizing hospitals.  Across many specifications, including those reported in Table 5, the
effect of for-profit market share on the profit margins of nonprofits is consistently negligible in a
statistical sense.  This evidence suggests that few, if any, nonprofits are for-profits in disguise.
We also find some evidence that for-profits have higher profits in high for-profit markets (Table
5).  The evidence is weak because failure to reject the null cannot be construed as acceptance of
an alternative hypothesis, and the coefficients are imprecisely estimated.  Further, we cannot rule
out that some nonprofits, perhaps quite a small number, are for-profits in disguise.
It is possible that the observed empirical patterns are simply the result of selection or
some other source of spurious correlation.  A commonly advanced alternative explanation is that
ownership does not lead to differences in service provision but instead leads to different choices
over location.  According, to this explanation, different hospital types pick markets based on the
characteristics of potential patients and the characteristics of the other hospitals serving those
potential patients.  We find this hypothesis unconvincing.  First, the explanation assumes low-
cost entry and exit, and a complete space of possible location choices, when in practice for-
profits have typically purchased nonprofits that were willing to sell or built new hospitals in
areas with population growth.  Second, our findings do not support this type of selection
explanation.  Coding individual hospitals by their initial for-profit market share or by their
current year for-profit market share yields similar results, suggesting that location choice does
not explain all relevant behavioral differences.  If choice of location drives these results, we
would expect the use of the initial-year variable to yield much weaker differences in the
predicted directions, but if anything, the effect of market mix seems marginally stronger in most
specifications.
Another alternative explanation is that patients choose hospital types based on the nature
of their ailments and the transparency of care quality.  This too seems unlikely.  First, given the
detailed demographic controls in our study, one needs a complicated story to explain why
patients in locations with high for-profit penetration are more likely to demand their profitable
services from nonprofits than in other locations.  Second, patients are treated their doctors and,
even more often, their insurers direct them.  Which hospitals accept a patient’s insurance plan or
where a patient’s doctor has admitting privileges are decisions that are generally exogenous to
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the patients’ illness.  Third, to the extent that some patients, through their doctors, are able to
match illnesses and hospitals, quality information is not readily available.  Quality report cards,
for example, only exist for a few treatments and cover few hospitals.
Assuming a causal interpretation could be imposed on the estimates, we cannot yet
identify the most efficient market mix.  Even if high concentrations of for-profit markets could
be shown to have a deleterious effect on nonprofit service provision, other researchers have
identified potential efficiency gains from for-profit ownership.  These may outweigh the danger
of inefficiently low provision of unprofitable services or inefficiently high provision of profitable
services.  To identify an optimal mix within a market, one needs to know both the differences
among ownership types and the market level implications of those differences.  This work
represents a first step in that direction.
32
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 72 [2007]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art72
31
References
Abraham, J. M., M. S. Gaynor, et al. (2005). Entry and Competition in Local Hospital Markets.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper
11649.
Arellano, M. (1987). "Computing Robust Standard Errors for Within-Groups Etimators." Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 49(4): 431-434.
Arrow, K. J. (1963). "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care." American
Economic Review 53(5): 941-73.
Baker, L. C. (1997). "The Effects of HMOs on Fee-for-service Health Care Expenditures:
Evidence from Medicare." Journal of Health Economics 16: 453-481.
Ben-Ner, A. (1983). Nonprofit Organizations:  Why do they Exist in Market Economies? New
Haven, Yale Program on Non-Profit Organizations, Working Paper 51.
Ben-Ner, A. and B. Gui (1993). The Nonprofit Sector in the Mixed Economy. Ann Arbor,
Michigan, University of Michigan Press.
Ben-Ner, A. and V. Hoomissen (1991). "Nonprofit Organizations in the Mixed Economy:  A
Demand and Supply Analysis." Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 63: 519-
550.
Chernew, M. (1995). "The Impact of Non-IPA HMOS on the Number of Hospitals and Hospital
Capacity." Inquiry 32: 143-154.
Clement, J. P., K. White, et al. (2002). "Charity Care:  Do Not-for-Profits Influence For-Profits?"
Medical Care Research and Review 59: 59-79.
Cremer, H., M. Marchand, et al. (1989). "The Public Firm as an Instrument for Regulating an
Oligopolistic Market." Oxford Economic Papers, New Series 41(2): 283-301.
Cutler, D. M. and J. R. Horwitz (2000). Converting Hospitals from Not-for-Profit to For-Profit
Status:  Why and What Effects? The Changing Hospital Industry:  Comparing Not-for-
Profit and For-Profit Institutions. D. M. Cutler, Ed. Chicago, University of Chicago
Press: 45-79.
Cutler, D. M. and R. S. Huckman (2003). "Technological Development and Medical
Productivity: the Diffusion of Angioplasty in New York State." Journal of Health
Economics 22(2): 187-217.
Cutler, D. M., M. McClellan, et al. (2000). "How Does Managed Care Do It?" RAND Journal of
Economics 31(3): 526-548.
Cutler, D. M., M. McClellan, et al. (2001). Pricing Heart Attack Treatments. Medical Care
Output and Productivity. D. M. Cutler and E. R. Berndt, Eds. Chicago and London, The
University of Chicago Press: 305-362.
Dafny, L. S. and D. Dranove (2006). Regulatory Exploitation and the Market for Corporate
Control. Cambridge, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 12438.
33
Horwitz and Nichols:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007
32
De Fraja, G. and F. Delbono (1989). "Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly."
Oxford Economic Papers, New Series 41(2): 302-311.
Deloitte & Touche (1990). U.S. Hospitals and the Future of Health Care. Boston, Massachusetts,
Deloitte & Touche.
Dhossche, D. M. and S. O. Ghani (1998). "A Study of Recidivism in the Psychiatric Emergency
Room." Annals of Clinical Psychiatry 10(2): 59-67.
Duggan, M. G. (2000). "Hospital Ownership and Public Medical Spending." Quarterly Journal of
Economics 115(4): 1343-1373.
Epstein, A. M. (2007). "Pay for Performance at the Tipping Point." New England Journal of
Medicine 356(5): 515-517.
Ettner, S. L. and R. C. Hermann (1987). "The Role of Profit Status Under Imperfect Information:
Evidence from the Treatment Patterns of Elderly Medicare Beneficiaries Hospitalized for
Psychiatric Diagnoses." Journal of Health Economics 20: 23-49.
Frank, R. and D. Salkever (1991). "The Supply of Charity Services by Nonprofit Hospitals:
Motives and Market Structure." RAND Journal of Economics 22(3): 43-45.
Gaynor, M. (2006). What Do We Know About Competition and Quality in Health Care
Markets? Cambridge, MA, NBER, Working Paper 12301.
Gaynor, M. and W. Vogt (2003). "Competition Among Hospitals." RAND Journal of Economics
34(4): 764-85.
Gentry, W. M. and J. R. Penrod (2000). The Tax Benefits of Not-for-profit Hospitals. The
Changing Hospital Industry:  Comparing Not-for-Profit and For-Profit Institutions. D. M.
Cutler, Ed. Chicago, Illinois, University of Chicago Press: 285-324.
Glaeser, E. L. and A. Shleifer (2001). "Not-for-profit Entrepreneurs." Journal of Public
Economics 81(1): 99-115.
Goody, B. (1993). "Defining Rural Hospital Markets." Health Services Research 28(2): 183-200.
Grabowski, D. C. and R. A. Hirth (2002). "Competitive Spillovers Across Non-profit and For-
Profit Nursing Homes." Journal of Health Economics 22: 1-22.
Gresenz, C. R., J. Rogowski, et al. (2004). "Updated Variable-Radius Measures of Hospital
Competition." Health Services Research 39(2): 417-430.
Gruber, J. (1994). "The Effect of Competitive Pressure on Charity:  Hospital Responses to Price
Shopping in California." Journal of Health Economics 13(2): 183-212.
Hansmann, H. (1980). "The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise." Yale Law Journal 89: 835-901.
Hansmann, H. (1987). "The Effect of Tax Exemption and Other Factors on the Market Share of
Nonprofit Versus For-Profit Firms." National Tax Journal 40: 71-82.
Hansmann, H., D. Kessler, et al. (2003). Ownership Form and Trapped Capital in the Hospital
Industry. The Governance of Not-for-Profit Organizations. E. L. Glaeser, Ed. Chicago,
University of Chicago Press: 45-69.
Hirth, R. A. (1997). "Competition Between For-Profit and Nonprofit Health Care Providers:  Can
it Help Achieve Social Goals?" Medical Care Research and Review 54: 414-38.
34
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 72 [2007]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art72
33
Hirth, R. A. (1999). "Consumer Information and Competition Between Nonprofit and For-Profit
Nursing Homes." Journal of Health Economics 18: 219-240.
Horwitz, J. (2005a). "Making Profits and Providing Care: Comparing Nonprofit, For-Profit and
Government Hospitals." Health Affairs 24(3): 790-801.
Horwitz, J. R. (2005b). Research Note:  Relative Profitability of Acute Care Hospital Services.
content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/24/3/790/DC1.
Horwitz, J. R. (2007). "Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?" Yale J. on Regulation 24: 140-204.
Hughes, R. G. and H. S. Luft (1990). "Keeping Up with the Joneses:  The Influence of Public
and Proprietary Neighbors on Voluntary Hospitals." Health Services Management
Research 3: 173-81.
James, E. and S. Rose-Ackerman (1986). The Nonprofit Enterprise in the Market Economics.
Chur, Switzerland, Harwood Academic Publishers.
Kessler, D. P. and M. B. McClellan (2002). "The Effects of Hospital Ownership on Medical
Productivity." RAND Journal of Economics 33(3): 488-506.
Kézdi, G. (2004). "Robust Standard Error Estimation in Fixed-Effects Panel Models." Hungarian
Statistical Review Special(9): 96-116.
Lakdawalla, D. and T. Philipson (2005). The Nonprofit Sector and Industry Performance.
Chicago, Illinois.
Liu, K., B. Gage, et al. (1999). Medicare's Post-Acute Benefit:  Background, Trends, and Issues
to Be Faced. http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/mpacb.htm.
Luft, H. S. and S. C. Maerki (1984). "Competitive Potential of Hospitals and Their Neighbors."
Contemporary Policy Issues Winter: 89-102.
Madison, K. (2004). "Multihospital System Membership and Patient Treatments, Expenditures,
and Outcomes." Health Services Research 39(4): 749-769.
Mann, J., G. Melnick, et al. (1995). "Uncompensated Care:  Hospitals' Responses to Fiscal
Pressures." Health Affairs 14: 263-70.
Marsteller, J. A., R. R. Bovberg, et al. (1998). "Nonprofit Conversion:  Theory, Evidence, and
State Policy Options." Health Services Research 33: 1495-1535.
McClellan, M. and D. Staiger (2000). Comparing Hospital Quality at For-Profit and Not-for-
Profit Hospitals. The Changing Hospital Industry:  Comparing Not-for-Profit and For-
Profit Institutions. D. M. Cutler, Ed. Chicago, Illinois, University of Chicago Press: 93-
112.
Melnick, G., C. Serrato, et al. (1989). "Prospective Payments to Hospitals:  Should Emergency
Admissions Have Higher Rates?" Health Care Financing Review 10(3): 29-39.
Newhouse, J. P. (1970). "Toward a Theory of Nonprofit Institutions:  An Economic Model of a
Hospital." The American Economic Review 60(1): 64-74.
Newhouse, J. P. (2001). Medicare Policy in the 1990s. Cambridge, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper 8531.
35
Horwitz and Nichols:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007
34
Newhouse, J. P. (2002). Pricing the Priceless:  A Health Care Conundrum. Cambridge,
Massachusetts, MIT Press.
Nichols, A. (2007). Vincenty: Stata Module to Calculate Distances on the Earth's Surface.
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456815.html.
Norton, E. C. and D. Staiger (1994). "How Hospital Ownership Affects Access to Care for the
Uninsured." RAND Journal of Economics 25: 171-85.
Pascal, A., M. Cvitanic, et al. (1989). "Special Report:  State Policies and the Financing of
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Care." Health Care Financing Review 11(1): 91-
104.
Pauly, M. V. and M. Redisch (1973). "The Not-for-Profit Hospital as Physicians' Cooperative."
American Economic Review 63(March): 87-99.
Philipson, T. J. and R. A. Posner (2006). Antitrust in the Not-for-Profit Sector. Cambridge, MA,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 12132.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1996). "Altruism, Not-for-profits, and Economic Theory." Journal of
Economic Literature 34: 701-728.
Rosenthal, M. B. and R. G. Frank (2006). "What is the Empirical Basis for Paying for Quality in
Health Care?" Medical Care Research and Review 63(2): 135-157.
Rosenthal, M. B., R. G. Frank, et al. (2005). "Early Experience with Pay-for-Performance."
Journal of the American Medical Association 294(14): 1788-1793.
Salamon, L. M. (1987). Partners in Public Service:  The Scope and Theory of Government
Nonprofit Relations. The Nonprofit Sector. W. W. Powell, Ed. New Haven, Connecticut,
Yale University Press: 99-117.
Santerre, R. E. and J. A. Vernon (2005). Hospital Ownership Mix Efficiency in the U.S.:  An
Exploratory Study, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 1192.
Schlesinger, M., J. D. Bentkover, et al. (1987). "The Privatization of Health Care and Physicians'
Perceptions of Access to Hospital Services." The Milbank Quarterly 65: 25-58.
Schlesinger, M., R. Dorwart, et al. (1997a). "Competition and Access to Hospital Services:
Evidence from Psychiatric Hospitals." Medical Care 35: 974-92.
Schlesinger, M., R. Dorwart, et al. (1997b). "The Determinants of Dumping:  A National Study
of Economically Motivated Transfers Involving Mental Health Care." Health Services
Research 32(5).
Shwed, H. (1980). "Teaching Emergency Room Psychiatry." Hospital & Community Psychiatry
31(8): 558-62.
Silverman, E. and J. Skinner (2004). "Medicare Upcoding and Hospital Ownership." Journal of
Health Economics 23(2): 369-389.
Sloan, F. (2000). Not-for-profit Ownership and Hospital Behavior. Handbook of Health
Economics. A. J. Culyer and J. P. Newhouse, Eds, Elsevier Science B.V. 1: 1141-1174.
36
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 72 [2007]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art72
35
Stock, J. H. and M. W. Watson (2006). Heteroskedasticity-Robust Standard Errors for Fixed
Effects Panel Data Regression. Cambridge, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Technical Working Paper No. 323.
Tye, L. (2001): "Beth Israel to Keep Psychiatric Unit Most Beds to Stay," Boston,
Massachusetts: Boston Globe, B2.
Weisbrod, B. A. (1988). The Nonprofit Economy. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard
University Press.
Westmoreland, T. (1999). Medicaid & HIV/AIDS Policy:  A Basic Primer. Washington, D.C.,
Georgetown University Law Center, Federal Legislation Clinic Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation.
Woodward, A., J. Epstein, et al. (1997). "The Drug Abuse Treatment Gap:  Recent Estimates."
Health Care Financing Review 18(3): 5-17.
Young, D. R. (1981). Entrepreneurship and the Behavior of Nonprofit Organizations:  Elements
of a Theory. Nonprofit Firms in a Three Sector Economy. M. J. White, Ed. Washington,
D.C., Urban Institute.
37
Horwitz and Nichols:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007
36
Table 1.  Hospital Ownership (1988-2005) By Year and Rural Status
Non-Rural,
Unweighted
Non-Rural,
weighted by
admissions
Rural,
Unweighted
Rural,
weighted by
admissions
Year Gov NFP FP Gov NFP FP Gov NFP FP Gov NFP FP
1988 17.91 64.46 17.63 17.39 73.12 9.49 43.17 47.63 9.20 32.00 58.37 9.62
1989 17.69 64.79 17.52 16.93 73.56 9.51 43.16 47.81 9.03 31.68 58.51 9.82
1990 17.67 65.22 17.10 16.80 73.74 9.46 43.13 48.02 8.85 31.63 58.53 9.83
1991 17.39 65.94 16.67 16.24 74.51 9.25 43.58 47.71 8.71 31.02 59.01 9.97
1992 17.83 65.62 16.54 16.27 74.43 9.29 43.73 48.41 7.85 31.16 59.84 9.00
1993 18.27 65.05 16.67 16.68 73.95 9.38 43.60 48.74 7.66 30.82 60.16 9.02
1994 18.11 64.51 17.37 16.80 73.03 10.18 42.05 50.35 7.60 26.55 65.74 7.72
1995 17.61 64.60 17.79 16.21 72.87 10.93 43.00 48.84 8.16 30.22 59.85 9.92
1996 17.64 64.36 18.00 15.75 72.54 11.71 42.83 48.94 8.23 29.54 60.18 10.28
1997 16.87 63.81 19.32 14.83 72.66 12.50 41.50 49.98 8.52 28.49 60.80 10.71
1998 16.28 64.89 18.83 14.00 73.54 12.46 40.68 50.67 8.65 27.82 61.57 10.62
1999 16.34 65.68 17.98 13.91 74.17 11.92 40.33 51.10 8.56 27.21 61.89 10.90
2000 15.72 66.01 18.27 13.25 74.43 12.31 39.76 51.83 8.41 26.83 61.98 11.19
2001 15.98 65.72 18.30 13.55 74.24 12.21 39.52 52.11 8.37 26.56 62.28 11.16
2002 15.93 65.69 18.38 13.67 73.95 12.37 38.76 52.67 8.57 25.70 62.89 11.41
2003 15.75 65.24 19.00 13.30 74.16 12.54 38.64 52.27 9.09 25.09 62.65 12.25
2004 15.79 64.58 19.63 13.54 73.69 12.77 38.43 52.00 9.57 25.33 62.11 12.56
2005 15.60 65.18 19.22 13.45 73.97 12.58 38.24 51.95 9.81 25.12 62.19 12.70
Avg.
all
years
16.91 65.08 18.01 15.14 73.70 11.16 41.34 50.06 8.60 28.49 61.03 10.48
Source: Authors’ analysis of American Hospital Association Annual Surveys 1988-2005.
Notes: Includes all general, medical, and surgical hospitals except Veterans’, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of Justice (prison), and
other federal or restricted use hospitals.
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Table 2.  Medical Services, Profitability, and Percentage of Hospitals in Sample Offering
Services
Service Profit Status FP>G %
Adult Day Care Program U*     U* 0.085
Alcohol/Chemical Dependency Care Beds (>0) U     I 0.158
Alcohol/Drug Abuse or Dependency Outpatient Services U     U 0.288
Angioplasty P     P*** 0.402
Birthing Room/LDR Room/LDRP Room P     U 0.735
Burn Care Beds U     U 0.047
Cardiac Catheterization Lab P     P* 0.541
Cardiac Intensive Care Beds (>0) P     P** 0.414
Certified Trauma Center U     U* 0.284
Child Psychiatric Services U     U* 0.246
Computed-Assisted Tomography Scanner (CT Scan) P     U 0.924
Diagnostic Radioisotope Facility P     P 0.813
Emergency Department U     U 0.958
Extracorporeal Shock-Wave Lithotripter P     P* 0.208
Fitness Center P     V 0.258
HIV-AIDS Services U     U*** 0.604
Home Health Services V     V** 0.411
Hospice U†     U** 0.232
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) P     P 0.533
Neonatal Intensive Care Beds  (>0) P     I 0.289
Neonatal Intermediate Care Beds (>0) P     I 0.171
Obstetric Care Beds  (>0) ?     U 0.756
Occupational Health Services ?     I 0.664
Open-Heart Surgery P     P*** 0.346
Outpatient Surgery ?     U 0.975
Patient Education Center U†     U 0.756
Patient Representative Services ?     U 0.716
Pediatric Intensive Care Beds  (>0) P     I 0.116
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) P     P 0.100
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Table 2 (continued).  Medical Services, Profitability, and Percentage of Hospitals in Sample
Offering Services
Service Profit Status FP>G %
Psychiatric Consultation/Liaison Services U I 0.432
Psychiatric Education Services U U 0.327
Psychiatric Emergency Services U U 0.455
Psychiatric Inpatient Beds  (>0) U U** 0.421
Psychiatric Outpatient Services U U 0.336
Psychiatric Partial Hospitalization Program U U 0.276
Radiation Therapy P U 0.367
Rehab Services ? U 0.771
Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography (SPECT) P U 0.451
Skilled Nursing Care Beds (>0) V V 0.315
Social Work Services U† U 0.911
Sports Medicine Services P U 0.352
Transplant Services ? P 0.131
Ultrasound P U 0.951
Volunteer Services Department U† U 0.888
Women's Health Center/Services P P 0.501
Notes: All designations of profit status are from Horwitz (2005b) unless noted with † = authors’ determination.
P=relatively profitable; U=relatively unprofitable, V=variably profitable; ? = insufficient AHA description to
categorize or, in the case of obstetric care because it draws from two distinct patient pools, one profitable, the
other unprofitable.   FP>G results are based on probit regressions using all control variables described in the text
and predicting probability of offering a service for each year in sample at the mean for-profit market share for for-
profit and government hospitals.  Significance tests from hypothesis
βFP*Year+βFP*Mkt*YearE(Mkt)=βGov*Year+βGov*Mkt*YearE(Mkt).  P= > 10% years show significant differences of FP>G
and < 10% years show significant differences of G>FP; U= < 10% years show significant differences of FP>G
and >10% years show significant differences of G>FP, V= > 10% years show significant differences of FP>G and
> 10% of years show significant differences of G>FP; I=indeterminate.  ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
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Table 3.  Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median
Residency Program 0.290 0.454 0.000
Teaching Hospital 0.107 0.309 0.000
Admissions Lowest Quintile 0.202 0.402 0.000
Admissions Quintile 2 0.202 0.402 0.000
Admissions Quintile 4 0.197 0.398 0.000
Admissions Quintile 5 0.199 0.399 0.000
Only 2 hospitals in MSA 0.045 0.206 0.000
Only 3 hospitals in MSA 0.056 0.229 0.000
Only 4 hospitals in MSA 0.063 0.243 0.000
HHI index 0.183 0.178 0.115
HMO penetration 0.090 0.099 0.056
Hospital member of system 0.608 0.488 1.000
Population 8.327 0.247 8.347
Number female 7.664 0.244 7.682
Number married, male 6.745 0.366 6.809
Number married, female 6.746 0.370 6.810
Number with Travel time under 5 mins     4.066 0.491 4.097
Number with Travel time 5 to 9mins 5.311 0.427 5.325
Number with Travel time 10 to 14mins     5.624 0.361 5.649
Number with Travel time 15 to 19mins     5.660 0.332 5.692
Number with Travel time 20 to 24mins     5.515 0.385 5.564
Number with Travel time 25 to 29mins     4.550 0.490 4.632
Number with Travel time 30 to 34mins     5.395 0.484 5.457
Number with Travel time 35 to 39mins     3.680 0.673 3.804
Number with Travel time 40 to 44mins     3.934 0.730 4.068
Number with Travel time 54 to 59mins     4.761 0.637 4.867
Number with Travel time 60 to 89mins     4.417 0.704 4.495
Number with Travel time over 90mins      3.653 0.789 3.759
Number who work at Home 3.944 0.534 4.039
Number who work in Ag/For/Fish 2.922 1.052 3.165
Number who work in Mining 1.305 1.438 1.613
Number who work in Const 4.729 0.465 4.807
Number who work in Wholesale Trade 4.212 0.437 4.242
Number who work in Retail 5.493 0.358 5.489
Number who work in FIRE 4.861 0.450 4.894
Number who work in Ent/Rec 3.422 0.534 3.471
Number who work in Manuf 5.546 0.465 5.593
Number who work in Health/Ed 5.919 0.324 5.947
Number who work in Pub Admin 4.447 0.436 4.476
Number who have educ under 9 yrs 5.349 0.447 5.338
Number who have educ less than HS 5.816 0.339 5.817
Number who have educ equiv to HS grad 6.617 0.326 6.649
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Table 3 (continued).  Summary Statistics
Number who have educ of some college 6.077 0.334 6.088
Number who have educ associate's 5.082 0.387 5.126
Number who have educ bachelor's 5.949 0.463 6.011
Number who have educ graduate school 5.405 0.535 5.447
Number aged under1 4.000 0.366 4.033
Number aged 1 to 17 6.872 0.337 6.910
Number aged 18 to 21 5.466 0.373 5.457
Number aged 22 to 29 6.157 0.318 6.147
Number aged 30 to 39 6.475 0.282 6.488
Number aged 40 to 49 6.364 0.341 6.416
Number aged 50 to 59 6.030 0.347 6.079
Number aged 60 to 64 5.088 0.305 5.111
Number aged 65 to 79 5.966 0.314 5.972
Number aged 80 plus 4.891 0.398 4.888
Number white 7.898 0.435 7.968
Number black 6.066 0.859 6.152
Number Native American                           3.029 1.065 3.134
Number Hispanic 5.884 1.173 6.014
Number other race 4.147 2.538 4.153
Income per capita 9.838 0.341 9.864
Number with HH income under 15k          5.662 0.407 5.628
Number with HH income 15~19 4.662 0.370 4.651
Number with HH income 20~29 5.360 0.324 5.358
Number with HH income 30~39 5.263 0.324 5.284
Number with HH income 40~49 5.070 0.373 5.115
Number with HH income 50~59 4.838 0.450 4.914
Number with HH income 60~74 4.901 0.564 5.012
Number with HH income 75~99 4.762 0.763 4.913
Number with HH income 100~149            4.371 0.981 4.525
Number with HH income above $150K 3.838 1.096 3.956
Notes:  N=46,075.  Population controls each represent the weighted average of linearly
interpolated and extrapolated (using 1990 and 2000 Census data) logs of the number of
relevant individuals in US Census tracts, with tracts weighted inversely by distance of their
centroids from the hospital. Linear interpolation in logs is similar to assuming constant
percentage rates of change in the size of subpopulations over 1988-2005.
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 Table 4.  Summary of Results, Service in High v. Low For-Profit Markets, % points
Service FP>G NP Gov FP
Relatively Profitable Services
Angioplasty (89-97) P***     .068***/**    .017/**    -.024
Birthing Room/LDR Room/LDRP Room U     .003   -.013     .009
Cardiac Catheterization Lab P*     .012    .033/*    -.049***/***
Cardiac Intensive Care Beds (>0) P**     .018    .060**/***    -.026
Computed-Assisted Tomography Scanner (CT) U     .009    .015/**     .001
Diagnostic Radioisotope Facility P     .004/**    .044*/    -.011
Extracorporeal Shock-Wave Lithotripter P*     .014*/*    .016    -.015
Fitness Center V     .010    .011    -.007
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) P     .058***/***    .071**/     .011/*
Neonatal Intensive Care Beds  (>0) I     .066***/***    .041/**     .021/*
Neonatal Intermediate Care Beds (>0) I     .021*/    .012/**    -.004
Open-Heart Surgery P***     .048***/**    .049    -.017
Pediatric Intensive Care Beds  (>0) I     .051***/***    .008     .085***/**
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) (90-05) P    -.003   -.009     .006***/
Radiation Therapy U     .017   -.003    -.015
Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography U    -.029    .026    -.034
Sports Medicine Services U    -.081***/***   -.029     .005
Ultrasound U     .004    .002    -.006/*
Women’s Health Center/Services P    -.006/**   -.028    -.034
Relatively Unprofitable Services
Alcohol/Chemical Dependency Beds (>0) (89-05) I    -.033 **/   -.021    -.036*/
Alcohol/Drug Abuse Outpatient Serv U    -.091***/***   -.071**/    -.029
Burn Care Beds U     .009    .007    -.005/**
Certified Trauma Center U*    -.023/**    .047    -.082***/***
Child Psychiatric Services U*    -.075***/***   -.052*/     .001
Emergency Department U    -.008/**    .002    -.009/*
HIV-AIDS Services (94-05) U***    -.059***/**    .001    -.019
Psychiatric Consultation/Liaison Services I    -.080***/**   -.058*/    -.066**/
Psychiatric Education Services U    -.054***/   -.020    -.023
Psychiatric Emergency Services U    -.060***/***   -.045    -.037
Psychiatric Inpatient Beds (>0) (89-05) U**    -.060***/***   -.036    -.047
Psychiatric Outpatient Services U    -.078***/***   -.018    -.006/**
Psychiatric Partial Hospitalization Program U    -.038**/*   -.001     .000
Geriatric Adult Day Care Program† U*    -.034***/**   -.029*/*     .008
Hospice† U**    -.073***/***    .000    -.003
Patient Education Center† U    -.048***/**    .005    -.060**/
Social Work Services† U    -.029***/***   -.006/*    -.031/***
Volunteer Services Department† U    -.016/**   -.050**/    -.031*/
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Table 4 (continued).  Summary of Results, Service in High v. Low For-Profit Markets, %
points
Service FP>G NP Gov FP
Variably Profitable Services
Home Health Services (1993-1997) V**     .056**/**     .034     .029
Skilled Nursing Care Beds (>0) (1993-1997) V     .087***/***     .046     .094**/**
Unknown (e.g., unclear definition, mixed patient
pool)
Obstetric Care Beds (>0) U    -.004    -.021     .016
Occupational Health Services I    -.030**/*    -.061**/    -.028
Outpatient Surgery U    -.013     .005    -.020***/
Rehab Services U    -.028/***     .024    -.002
Patient Representative Services U    -.025/***     .009/*    -.015
Transplant Services P     .007        0    -.025*/**
Notes:  NP=nonprofit, FP=for-profit, Gov=government.  Results are from all years 1988-2005 unless noted.  Results
for variably profitable services are for years 1993-1997, when the services were profitable.  Profitability status in the
first column is assigned according to Horwitz (2005b) except † where categorized according to authors' evaluation.
Profitability status in the second column, FP>G indicates whether a service is U=relatively unprofitable,
P=relatively profitable, I=indeterminate, V=variable based on tests, described in the text, of whether for-profit
hospitals are more likely than government hospitals to offer the service.  All results from basic specification
described in text (market measure by distance, controls as described in the text.  For the point estimates, we present
results from two types of hypothesis tests, whether 1) the coefficients on hospital type*market type are different on
average over the study period and 2) these coefficients are jointly different.  ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
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Table 5.  Regressions of Hospital Operating Margin on Characteristics of Hospitals and
Markets
Discrete measure of high FP market (share>15%) Continuous measure of FP market share
Pooled Pooled Fixed Eff Fixed Eff Pooled Pooled Fixed Eff Fixed Eff
Gov -0.0630 -0.0567 -0.0531 -0.0425 -0.0630 -0.0779 -0.0531 -0.0758
Hosp (-0.89) (-0.62) (-0.58) (-0.38) (-0.89) (-1.04) (-0.58) (-0.90)
For-Profit -0.0282 -0.0526 -0.0324 -0.0425 -0.0282 -0.0705 -0.0324 -0.0981
Hosp (-0.68) (-0.71) (-0.70) (-0.64) (-0.68) (-0.99) (-0.70) (-1.11)
ln(admissions) 0.0208 0.0208 0.0255 0.0253 0.0208 0.0222 0.0255 0.0253
(0.53) (0.54) (0.64) (0.64) (0.53) (0.59) (0.64) (0.64)
ln(beds) 0.0231 0.0223 0.0236 0.0236 0.0231 0.0235 0.0236 0.0240
(0.49) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.49) (0.50) (0.47) (0.48)
Teaching -0.139 -0.138 -0.148 -0.148 -0.139 -0.142 -0.148 -0.149
(-0.59) (-0.59) (-0.57) (-0.57) (-0.59) (-0.60) (-0.57) (-0.57)
Residency -0.163** -0.163** -0.169** -0.169** -0.163** -0.164** -0.169** -0.169**
(-2.14) (-2.13) (-2.21) (-2.21) (-2.14) (-2.15) (-2.21) (-2.20)
System 0.119 0.119 0.171 0.171 0.119 0.118 0.171 0.169
Member (1.37) (1.36) (1.42) (1.42) (1.37) (1.36) (1.42) (1.43)
HMO 0.0176 0.0127 -0.647 -0.658 0.0176 0.0128 -0.647 -0.644
mkt share (0.05) (0.04) (-1.31) (-1.33) (0.05) (0.04) (-1.31) (-1.30)
#hosp in -0.00324 -0.00328 0.00219 0.00205 -0.00324 -0.00317 0.00219 0.00211
Market (-1.04) (-1.05) (0.37) (0.35) (-1.04) (-1.04) (0.37) (0.35)
HH index -0.104 -0.0976 -0.149 -0.140 -0.104 -0.0950 -0.149 -0.130
(-0.85) (-0.79) (-1.27) (-1.18) (-0.85) (-0.78) (-1.27) (-1.09)
High-FP 0.0149 0.0500 -0.165 -0.164
Market (0.54) (1.43) (-1.22) (-0.67)
High-FP -0.0247 -0.0328 0.153 0.160
mkt*Gov (-0.33) (-0.45) (1.55) (1.28)
High-FP 0.0407 0.0303 0.271* 0.330
mkt*FP (0.47) (0.29) (1.69) (1.52)
N 40214 40214 40214 40214 40214 40214 40214 40214
r2 0.00206 0.00206 0.00319 0.00320 0.00206 0.00208 0.00319 0.00321
Notes:  Hospital operating margins from patient services = (total patient revenue – contractual allowances – total
operating expenses)/ (total patient revenues – contractual allowances).  All regressions are based on distance-
weighted measure of markets and for-profit market share.  All regressions include controls described in text.  T-
statistics in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 5b.  Logit Regressions of P(Offering a Service) on Hospital Ownership, Market Type,
and Profitability Classification of Service (1988-2005)
FP Market Share Defined by:
Share FP in
MSA
Overlap-
weighted
Distance-
Weighted
Government -0.00791 0.00253 -0.00155
(-0.18) (0.06) (-0.04)
For-profit -0.331*** -0.346*** -0.363***
(-6.29) (-6.75) (-7.93)
Gov x profitable service -0.0860 -0.0799 -0.0684
(-1.61) (-1.53) (-1.33)
NP x profitable service -0.0615*** -0.0523*** -0.0392**
(-3.30) (-2.81) (-2.12)
FP x profitable service 0.291*** 0.345*** 0.340***
(5.06) (6.28) (7.06)
Hi-FP Market x Gov -0.208*** -0.238*** -0.206***
(-3.75) (-4.23) (-3.58)
Hi-FP Market x NP -0.321*** -0.296*** -0.298***
(-9.72) (-8.97) (-8.57)
Hi-FP Market x FP -0.175*** -0.158*** -0.133**
(-2.92) (-2.66) (-2.42)
Hi-FP Market x Gov x profitable serv 0.286*** 0.338*** 0.316***
(4.04) (4.72) (4.30)
Hi-FP Market x NP x profitable serv 0.476*** 0.457*** 0.433***
(12.60) (12.10) (10.88)
Hi-FP Market x FP x profitable serv 0.146** 0.0903 0.101
(2.09) (1.32) (1.58)
MSA-level HHI 0.255*** 0.277*** 0.298***
(3.20) (3.45) (3.72)
HMO share 0.0178 0.0311 0.0190
(0.35) (0.61) (0.37)
System Membership 0.0498*** 0.0482*** 0.0463***
(3.25) (3.14) (3.02)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Hospital Fixed Effects No No No
Census and Size Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 1,496,424 1,500,623 1,500,023
Notes: NP=nonprofit, FP=for-profit, Gov=government.   Results for all services, all years except as noted in Table
4.  Profitability status determined according to Horwitz (2005b) as described in text.  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***
p<0.001; t-statistics in parentheses, robust to clustering at the hospital level
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Table 6.  Nonprofit Hospitals in Low v. High Markets:  Theoretical Predictions, Medical
Services, and Profit Margins
Theories
Service Provision in Low
v.
High FP Markets
Profit Margins in Low
v.
 High FP Markets
NP Hospitals Have Higher
Pr of Offering Profitable
Services in High-FP Markets
NP Hospitals Have Lower Pr
of Offering Unprofitable
Services in High-FP Markets
Observed Pattern
of Results
Yes Yes No Difference:  NPs have lower
margins than FPs but are no
lower in High-FP markets.
1. NPs Max Own
Output
e.g., Newhouse
(1970)
Yes: FPs will take most
profitable patients, NPs lose
money with unchanged
service mix; have to move
into profitable services to
break even.
Yes: FPs will take most
profitable patients, NPs lose
money with unchanged
service mix; have to move
out of unprofitable services
to break even.
No Difference: NPs have to
offer more profitable and
less unprofitable services to
earn same level of
profitability on average.
2. NPs Max
Market Output
e.g., Weisbrod
(1977)
Likely No.  Possibly Yes if
NPs offer more of every
service to offset cherry-
picking by FPs.
No: NPs offset mercenary
behavior of FPs by
increasing provision of
unprofitable services.
No Difference or Margins lower
in High-FP Markets:  NPs offer
more unprofitable services to
offset FPs, but must still break
even on average.
3.  NPs are FPs in
Disguise, Doctors
Cooperative
e.g., Pauly and
Redisch (1973)
No: FPs and NPs are
identical in objectives, and
the change of market
penetration of forms should
have no effect.
No: FPs and NPs are
identical in objectives, and
the change of market
penetration of forms should
have no effect.
Margins lower in High-FP
Markets: if the NP form is more
attractive for a market, NP
margins are higher, and there
would be more NP and fewer
FP hospitals (low-FP market).
4.  Mixture
Theories
e.g., Hirth (1997):
some output-max
NPs, some profit-
seeking NPs
Either Yes or No, as in rows
(1) or (3), depending on
which type dominates.
Either Yes or No, as in rows
(1) or (3), depending on
which type dominates
Either higher, lower, or same.
Most plausible is that NP
margins are higher in High-FP
markets because for-profits in
disguise face less competition
from altruistic nonprofits.
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Figure 1.  Relatively Profitable Services
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Figure 2.  Relatively Unprofitable Services
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Figure 3.  Services with Variable Profits
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Appendix A.  Hospital Market Definitions and Measures of For-Profit Share of Market
The idea of defining a hospital market is to capture the population of potential patients,
most of whom live within an easy commute of the hospital, and identify the other hospitals
competing for those patients.  To measure the share of for-profit competition (the “for-profit
share” below), these hospitals should be weighted according to the extent to which they can
compete for patients, i.e., by the size of the hospital and by the potential patients who live within
an easy commute of both hospitals.
We employ three methods to construct the for-profit market share facing each hospital.
The simplest method is derived from each hospital’s MSA.  We propose two alternatives, both
based on the distance between hospitals (as measured along the ellipsoidal “zero elevation”
model5 of the Earth), which we call the disk-overlap and distance-weighted measures.  We prefer
the distance-weighted method for reasons explained below.
1.  MSA-level estimates of for-profit share
The least complicated measure of people who live within an easy commute is the MSA,
defined by the Census Bureau so that a labor market is encompassed and individuals within the
MSA are very likely to commute only within the MSA.  We can easily calculate the proportion
of hospitals that are for-profits, weighting by their annual admissions to adjust for capacity,
within the MSA.
Two definitions are possible even restricting to MSA-level means of FOR-PROFIT status
weighted by admissions. The market definition excluding a hospital’s own ownership category
and admissions will be referred to as not-i, and a definition including a hospital’s own
characteristics will be referred to as also-i. The also-i definition is the same for all hospitals in
an MSA, and may be intuitively appealing, simple to calculate (being close to a count of for-
profit hospitals divided by number of hospitals), and easily explained.  However, it is also
determined by the hospitals own behavior (both ownership and admissions are endogenously
determined), and does not characterize the competition or environment a hospital faces any more
than it does the hospital’s own choices.  Thus, we prefer the not-i definition (though results using
the also-i definition are surprisingly similar—restricted to hospitals in MSA’s with at least two
hospitals).
However, hospitals not in an MSA (which we call rural hospitals) are problematic in this
formulation, as are groups of hospitals near an MSA boundary—the hospital just inside the
boundary is seen as competing with distant central-city hospitals, and not with a hospital just
outside the boundary.  This can be seen as a problem with the weight assigned to a given hospital
being discontinuous at the boundary of the MSA, which is one everywhere in the MSA, ignoring
any variations in admissions, but drops abruptly to zero at the boundary of the MSA.  Alternative
definitions of markets that rely on geopolitical divisions, such as counties or zip codes (as are the
Dartmouth health care referral regions), exhibit identical problems.
5 For details of distance calculations, see http://www-personal.umich.edu/~nicholsa/stata/vincenty.ado
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2.  Disk-overlap estimates of for-profit share
In this specification, we identified a hospital’s potential market as a disk with a fixed
radius centered on the hospital’s own location (10 or 15 miles are radii commonly used in the
literature).6  For-profit share can then be defined as the area overlap of the hospital’s own disk
with other hospitals’ disks, weighted by total admissions in the calendar year. Luft and Maerki
(1984) define markets based on the willingness of a physician to travel and conclude that 15
miles is the maximum distance.
Define a circle of influence as every point within 15 miles of a given hospital. Now
define the market faced by the hospital as the total admissions for every other hospital whose
circle of influence overlaps the circle of influence belonging to that hospital, weighted by the
proportion of overlap. Note there are two possible implementations of this definition, depending
on how one treats the hospital’s own circle. The market definition excluding a hospital’s own
circle of influence will be referred to as not-i, and a definition including a hospital’s own circle
of influence will be referred to as also-i. The new definition of market for-profit concentration is
the percentage of admissions in the market that are to a for-profit hospital.  As a concrete
example, consider the hypothetical MSA drawn in Figure A1, with an irregular dashed line
indicating the boundary of the MSA, to emphasize that the boundary is irrelevant to the
calculations that follow.
Figure  A1
A B C
1000
admissions 2000
admissions
3000
admissions
Hypothetical MSA
There are three hospitals, a hospital B in the central city, and two suburban hospitals A
and C. The distance between hospitals A and B is twenty miles, and the distance between
hospitals B and C is fifteen miles. Hospitals A and C have zero overlap, since all hospitals lie on
a straight line in alphabetical order. The overlap area between any two hospitals as a proportion
of the total land area of the market is
Overlap = [2acos(d/2r)-sin(2 acos(d/2r))] /p 
6 10.4 miles is the mean distance radius that captures 75 percent of discharges and 21.5 is the mean distance radius
that captures 90 percent of discharges from acute care hospitals in non-rural settings.  14.2 miles is the mean
distance radius that captures 75 percent of discharges and 25.2 is the mean distance radius that captures 90 percent
of discharges from acute care hospitals in rural settings. (Gresenz, Rogowski et al. 2004)
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where d is the distance between the hospitals and r is the radius of the circle of influence (both
10 miles and 15 miles were used to produce estimates). Thus the overlap between A and B is
nearly 22% and the overlap between B and C is just over 39%.  These percentages are the
weights applied to admissions, which are assumed in this example to be 1000 in A, 2000 in B,
and 3000 in C.  Assume C is the only for-profit hospital in the MSA. Using the not-i market
definition, the market for-profit concentration for A is zero, for B it is just under 73%, and for C
it is zero. Using the also-i market definition, the market for-profit concentration for A is zero, for
B it is about 32%, and for C it is over 79%.  The also-i market definition corresponds more
closely to an intuitive notion of market concentration, but it is endogenous to unilateral actions
by the hospital.  Although the disk-overlap measure of for-profit market share does not suffer
from the sharp exclusion at the boundary, it also does not capture the possible influence of more
distant but much larger hospitals.
3.  Distance-weighted estimates of for-profit share
To address the limitations of the first two market methods, we employ a third method, the
distance-weighted method.  One can imagine a market with two hospitals, each of which has
1000 admissions annually, 25 miles apart, and a third hospital 30 miles from the first and 40
miles from the second, which has 10,000 admissions annually, which should clearly matter to the
market that the first hospital faces, and yet this third hospital is irrelevant in the disk-overlap
measure of for-profit market share.  A more sensible method would weight by admissions and
inversely by distance, so that distant hospitals have less importance relative to nearer hospitals,
but may still play a role.
It might seem intuitive to use the reciprocal of distance squared, and its properties are
invariant to the scale used for distance.  Unfortunately, when calculating a weighted average of
characteristics over a collection of discrete points using the reciprocal of distance squared as the
weight, only the points that are very close to the central point (hospital i’s own location) get any
kind of weight.  If there are 12 census tract centroids within 10 miles, and one that’s a block
away, only the close one matters.  This problem arises because the weight on a point approaches
infinity as the distance of that point from the hospital approaches zero.
The square of the reciprocal of one plus the distance squared places more reasonable
relative weights on points of different distances from the hospital, but its properties as a weight
are not invariant to the units of distance.  However, a particular parameterization accords well
with the observed distribution of patients. A disk around an non-rural hospital that encompasses
75% of the hospital's patients' residences has a mean radius of 10.4 miles, median radius 8.5
miles, standard deviation 8.5, and range [0.2, 78.4]. A disk around an non-rural hospital that
encompasses 90% has a mean radius of 21.5 miles, median 15.7 miles, standard deviation 19.7,
and range [0.4, 179.3].
Consider the family of weighting functions
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where x is distance from hospital i’s own location.  Now choose b so that 75% of the weight lies
within 10.4 miles of the center for an even distribution of potential patients over different
distances, regardless of how distance is measured.  Thus we choose b so that
75.0
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This weight function decays smoothly, does not put infinite weight on arbitrarily close
points, and corresponds to the notion that 75% of the patients come from a disk of radius 10.4
miles.
Since we are working in 3 dimensions, we need to calculate the volume contained under
the curve
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rotated about the w-axis in (x1,x2,w) space, which is given by
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using the shell method for integration of a volume of a rotational solid. The area from 0 to C
miles, if x is measured in miles, is
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so the ratio of the weight within C=10.4 miles to the total weight is
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and this will be 0.75 when b=0.0277, in which case the weighted proportion of an evenly
distributed population contained within C=21.5 miles is 0.928 (corresponding closely to the
notion that the mean radius of a disk that encloses 90% of the weighted population is 21.5 miles).
4.  Comparison of Three Market Definitions
The weight of a potential competitor relative to a the weight of a competitor at the
hospital’s own address is shown in Figure A2 for the disk-overlap measures (both 10 and 15 mile
radii), the distance-weighted measure, and a conceptualization of the MSA-level measure for
comparison purposes (the actual space is three-dimensional, corresponding to a rotation of this
figure around the vertical axis).
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Figure A2. Comparison of Weighting Methods
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Although there are major differences in the weight assigned to neighboring hospitals, a
wide variety of results are very similar across these specifications.  This may reflect the fact that
many hospitals have a number of large neighbors within five miles, and relatively few five to
twenty miles away.  If the geographic distribution of hospitals is very concentrated, differences
in weights attached to hospitals five to twenty miles away may make little difference.
In sensitivity tests, we compute four different measures of for-profit hospital penetration
for each definition of market (MSA, disk-overlap, and distance-weighted:  weighted admission
share including the observed hospital, and weighted admission share excluding the observed
hospital, and both as observed in the first year the hospital appears in the data.  We also define
markets by using geopolitical boundaries analogous to the MSA method described above. The
only apparent differences arise in comparing results excluding a hospital’s own admissions and
FP/NFP status, versus including it in the definition of market for-profit share.  Otherwise, these
alternative models of market share produce strikingly similar results.
All results in this paper compare only hospitals in MSA’s (i.e., rural hospitals are
excluded from the analysis and calculations of FP market share), and only those in MSA’s that
include at least two hospitals (since FP market share using the MSA method excluding a
hospital’s own admissions and FP/NFP status is otherwise undefined).  Future work will include
analyses that examine rural hospitals as well, and for these hospitals, the distance-weighted
measure is the only viable alternative for defining the FP market share.
The distance-weighted measure has a clear intuitive appeal, and is calibrated to match the
empirical distribution of potential patients.  It is the only option for dealing with the rural
hospitals currently excluded.  For these reasons, we prefer the distance-weighted measure of FP
market share.
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Appendix B.  Defining Market Share
Applying the three market methods described in Appendix A, approximately 60 to 65
percent of hospitals are “low” for-profit share, and 25 to 30 percent of hospitals are “high” for-
profit share and very few are in the “middle.”  The graph below shows the share by year (the
share of hospitals classified as being in “high” for-profit share markets is the distance from the
top to the “High FP” line, and the share of hospitals classified as being in “high” for-profit share
markets is the distance from the bottom to the “Low FP” line). The fact that all the lines are close
indicates that few hospitals are excluded from the analysis due to being considered “middle for-
profit share” and suggests that classifications are similar.
The correlations in for-profit share measures are quite high:
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Appendix C.  Figures for All Medical Services
1. Relatively Profitable Services
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2.  Relatively Unprofitable Services
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4. Profitability Unknown (e.g., unclear definition, mixed patient pool)
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Appendix D.  Fixed-effects Estimates of Probability of Offering Medical Services by
Ownership Type as For-Profit Market Share Increases and Medical Service Profitability
Designation, 1988-2005
FE estimate of the effect of
increased FP share;
exponentiated coefficients
represent positive effect when
greater than 1
Profitability Status
Percentage
of
Hospitals
Offering
Service
Service Gov NFP FP QualitativeApproach FP>G %
Adult Day Care Program 0.839 1.084 1.738 U*   U* 0.085
Alcohol/Chem. Depend. Beds (>0) (89-05) 1.356 0.664 0.857 U   I 0.158
Alcohol/Drug Abuse or Dependency
Outpatient Services 1.274 0.657 1.026 U   U 0.288
Angioplasty (89-97) 1.221 1.278 0.574 P   P*** 0.402
Birthing Room/LDR Room/LDRP Room 1.968 1.996* 2.070 P   U 0.735
Burn Care Beds 1.263 1.324 0.0888 U   U 0.047
Cardiac Catheterization Lab 2.617 1.408 0.561 P   P* 0.541
Cardiac Intensive Care Beds (>0) 2.431 0.540* 0.715 P   P** 0.414
Certified Trauma Center 1.361 0.787 0.542 U   U* 0.284
Child Psychiatric Services 1.421 1.096 2.915 U   U* 0.246
Computed-Assisted Tomography Scan (CT) 1.778 1.215 1.543 P   U 0.924
Diagnostic Radioisotope Facility 2.005* 1.321 1.342 P   P 0.813
Emergency Department 4.993 2.196 4.647* U   U 0.958
Extracorporeal Shock-Wave Lithotripter 1.754 0.928 0.432* P   P* 0.208
Fitness Center 1.098 1.009 0.620 P   V 0.258
HIV-AIDS Services (94-05) 1.341 0.681 0.669 U   U*** 0.604
Home Health Services 1.868 1.338 1.496 V   V** 0.411
Hospice 4.147** 2.382** 3.007* U†   U** 0.232
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) 2.117 1.304 0.791 P   P 0.533
Neonatal Intensive Care Beds  (>0) 1.844 1.490 0.841 P   I 0.289
Neonatal Intermediate Care Beds (>0) 1.106 0.868 0.745 P   I 0.171
Obstetric Care Beds  (>0) 1.920 1.846 2.424 ?   U 0.756
Occupational Health Services 1.441 1.227 1.343 ?   I 0.664
Open-Heart Surgery 3.128 0.804 0.588 P   P*** 0.346
Outpatient Surgery 2.112 2.221 0.778 ?   U 0.975
Patient Education Center 1.520 0.893 0.478* U†   U 0.756
Patient Representative Services 1.892 1.111 0.772 ?   U 0.716
Pediatric Intensive Care Beds  (>0) 0.308 1.300 3.775 P   I 0.116
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) (90-05) 1.337 1.019 0.585 P   P 0.100
Psychiatric Consultation/Liaison Services 1.344 0.786 0.717 U   I 0.432
Psychiatric Education Services 1.693 1.076 1.137 U   U 0.327
Psychiatric Emergency Services 1.638 0.983 1.139 U   U 0.455
Psychiatric Inpatient Beds  (>0) (89-05) 2.063 0.882 1.132 U   U** 0.421
Psychiatric Outpatient Services 1.614 0.671 1.870 U   U 0.336
Psychiatric Partial Hospitalization Program 1.886 0.967 1.575 U   U 0.276
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Appendix D (continued).  Fixed-effects Estimates of Probability of Offering Medical
Services by Ownership Type as For-Profit Market Share Increases and Medical Service
Profitability Designation, 1988-2005
FE estimate of the effect of
increased FP share;
exponentiated coefficients
represent positive effect when
greater than 1
Profitability Status
Percentage
of
Hospitals
Offering
Service
Service Gov NFP FP QualitativeApproach FP>G %
Radiation Therapy 1.451 1.369 0.946 P U 0.367
Rehab Services 2.359* 1.242 1.258 ? U 0.771
Single Photon Emission Comp. Tomography 1.812 1.116 0.928 P U 0.451
Skilled Nursing Care Beds (>0) 1.557 0.737 1.158 V V 0.315
Social Work Services 1.439 1.142 1.147 U† U 0.911
Sports Medicine Services 1.557 1.204 1.367 P U 0.352
Transplant Services 0.859 0.867 0.614 ? P 0.131
Ultrasound 0.854 1.578 1.487 P U 0.951
Volunteer Services Department 1.245 1.262 0.565 U† U 0.888
Women's Health Center/Services 1.100 1.331 1.451 P P 0.501
Notes: All designations of profit status in Qualitative Approach column are from Horwitz (2005b) unless noted.  For
profit status: † = authors’ determination.  P=relatively profitable; U=relatively unprofitable, V=variable; ? = insufficient
AHA description to categorize.  Obstetric care draws from two distinct patient pools, one profitable, the other
unprofitable.
FP>G results are based on probit regressions using all control variables described in the text and predicting probability of
offering a service for each year in sample at the mean for-profit market share for for-profit and government hospitals.
Significance tests from hypothesis βFP*Year+βFP*Mkt*YearE(Mkt) = βGov*Year+βGov*Mkt*YearE(Mkt).  P= > 10% years show
significant differences of FP>G and < 10% years show significant differences of G>FP; U= < 10% years show
significant differences of FP>G and >10% years show significant differences of G>FP, V= > 10% years show significant
differences of FP>G and > 10% of years show significant differences of G>FP; I=indeterminate.  ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,
*p<0.10.
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